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Many early Internet protocols were designed without a fundamentally secure 
infrastructure and hence vulnerable to attacks such as denial of service (DoS) attacks 
and worms. DoS attacks attempt to consume the resources of a remote host or network, 
thereby denying or degrading service to legitimate users. Network forensics is an 
emerging area wherein the source or the cause of the attacker is determined using IDS 
tools. The problem of finding the source(s) of attack(s) is called the “trace back 
problem”. Lately, Internet worms have become a major problem for the security of 
computer networks, causing considerable amount of resources and time to be spent 
recovering from the disruption of systems. In addition to breaking down victims, these 
worms create large amounts of unnecessary network data traffic that results in network 
congestion, thereby affecting the entire network.  
In this dissertation, first we solve the trace back problem more efficiently in terms 
of the number of routers needed to complete the track back. We provide an efficient 
algorithm to decompose a network into connected components and construct a terminal 
network. We show that for a terminal network with n routers, the trace back can be 
completed in O(log n) steps. 
Second, we apply two classical epidemic SIS and SIR models to study the spread of 
Internet Worm.  The analytical models that we provide are useful in determining the 
rate of spread and time required to infect a majority of the nodes in the network.  Our 
simulation results on large Internet like topologies show that in a fairly small amount 
of time, 80% of the network nodes is infected.   
 
xiv
Third, we have analyzed the tradeoff between delay caused by filtering of worms at 
routers, and the delay due to worms’ excessive amount of network traffic. We have 
used the optimal control problem, to determine the appropriate tradeoffs between these 
two delays for a given rate of a worm spreading.  Using our technique we can minimize 
the overall network delay by finding the number of routers that should perform filtering 





Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Internet Attacks 
The basis for the Internet was an experiment begun in 1968 by the Defense 
Department’s Information Processing Techniques Office (ARPA/IPTO) to connect 
computers over a network in order to ensure command and control communications in 
the event of a nuclear war. In the 1980s, the number of local area networks increased 
significantly and this stimulated rapid growth of interconnections to the ARPAnet and 
other networks.  These networks and interconnections are known today as the Internet 
[1]. 
Many early Internet protocols were designed without a fundamentally secure 
infrastructure so that network defense becomes more difficult. Because of the openness 
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of the Internet and the original design of the protocols, Internet attacks in general are 
quick, easy, inexpensive, and may be hard to detect or trace. An attacker does not have 
to be physically present to carry out the Internet attack. In fact, many attacks can be 
launched readily from anywhere in the world - the location of the attacker can easily be 
hidden.  
Since much of the traffic on the Internet is not encrypted, confidentiality and 
integrity are difficult to achieve. The factor that contributes to the vulnerability of the 
Internet is the rapid growth and use of the network, accompanied by rapid deployment 
of network services. Often, these services are not designed, configured, or maintained 
securely. This lack of secure configuration makes them vulnerable to attacks, which 
sometimes occur within minutes of connection. Finally, the more systems that are 
connected to Internet, obviously the harder it is to control their security. Clearly, if a 
site is connected to the Internet at several points, it likely would be more vulnerable to 
attacks than a site with a single gateway. 
 
1.1.1 Denial of service (DoS) attacks 
On the Internet, a denial of service (DoS) attack attempts to consume the resources of a 
remote host or network, thereby denying or degrading service to legitimate users. In 
other words, a denial of service attack prevents the targeted site from providing 
network services by either flooding the site with bogus packets or consuming limited 
network resources. Furthermore, a denial of service attack might use multiple systems 
to attack one or more victim systems with the intent of denying service to legitimate 
 
2
users of the victim systems. Typically, the loss of service is the inability of a particular 
network service such as e-mail service, or the temporary loss of all network 
connectivity and services. A denial of service attack can also destroy programming and 
files in a computer system. The major advantage of a DoS attack is that it is quite 
difficult to determine the actual source of the attack. Since the attacker can basically put 
any packet on the local wire, the attacker creates packets whose source IP address is 
invalid and completely random. Thus, when the victims receive these packets, they are 
unable to determine the source.  
The most common kind of a DoS attack is simply to send more traffic to the 
network than it can handle, called packet flooding. Then the network’s connection 
becomes congested, resulting in packet loss. Since routers cannot distinguish between 
attacking packets and valid client packets, they drop them with equal probability. If the 
attacker can send packets fast enough, the drop rate can become so high that a number of 
client's packets cannot get through. A more recent and well-known attack called "smurf" 
attack [2] use reflectors to multiply the effect of the DoS attack. In this type of attack an 
attacker is using ICMP echo request packets directed to IP broadcast addresses from 
remote locations to generate denial-of-service attacks.  
 
1.1.2 Internet Worms  
Lately, Internet worms have become a major problem for the security of computer 
networks, causing considerable amount of resources and time to be spent recovering 
from virulent attacks. In general, worms, defined as self-propagating malicious codes, 
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have been developed since the Morris worm arose in 1988 [7]. Unlike a virus, which 
requires a user to do something to continue the propagation, a worm can propagate by 
itself. The convenience of Internet makes it more vulnerable for malicious Internet 
exploits. In other words, the Internet has become a powerful means for propagating 
malicious programs like computer viruses and worms. The Code Red worm incidents 
of 2001 have shown us how vulnerable Internet hosts are and how fast a virulent worm 
can spread across the Internet (Code Red infected more than 250,000 systems in just 9 
hours on July 19, 2001). Moore [4] provided some characteristics of the worm spread 
and trace analyses of Code Red worm behavior. Weaver [14, 15] introduced worm 
design strategies, which can be used to produce significantly faster and longer lived 
Internet worms.  
A worm, on the other hand, is far more powerful and faster. The Sapphire/Slammer 
Worm was the fastest Internet worm in history. As it began spreading throughout the 
Internet, it infected at least 75,000 vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes [3]. When a 
worm gains access to a computer (usually by breaking into it over the Internet), it 
launches a program which searches for other Internet locations, infecting them if it can. 
Moreover, the worm travels over the Internet, so all machines attached to an infected 
machine are at risk of attack. Some worms attempt to perform a Denial of Service 
attack (Code Red/W32.Blaster) or to compromise systems and deface web site 
(sadmind/IIS, Code Red); and others have dynamic configuration capabilities 
(W32.Leaves) [3]. But the biggest impact of these worms is that their propagation 
effectively creates a denial of service in many parts of the Internet because of the huge 
amounts of scan traffic generated, and they cause much substantial damage. 
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1.2 Computer Worms 
Computer worms and viruses are typically grouped together as infectious agents that 
replicate themselves and spread from system to system. However, Computer worms 
must be differentiated from computer viruses if we are to understand how they operate, 
spread, and can be defended against. Computer worms alter the behavior of the 
computer they infect. Computer worms typically install themselves onto the infected 
system and begin execution, utilizing the system’s resources, including its network 
connection and storage capabilities. 
 
1.2.1 Worms vs. Viruses 
Both worms and viruses spread from a computer to other computers. However, viruses 
typically spread by attaching themselves to files (either data files or executable 
applications). Their spread requires the transmission of the infected file from one 
system to another. Worms, in contrast, are capable of autonomous migration from 
system to system via network without the assistance of external software. In other 
words, a worm is an active and volatile automated delivery system that controls the 
medium (typically network) used to reach a specific target system. Viruses, in contrast, 
are a static medium that does not control the distribution medium. 
From the Morris worm [7] in 1998, a computer worm was defined as follows: 
“In computers, a worm is a program that travels from one computer to another 
but does not attach itself to the operating system of the computer it infects. It 
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differs from a virus which is also a migrating program, but one that attaches 
itself to the operating system of any computer it enters and can infect any other 
computer that uses files from the infected computer.” 
Currently Many worms hide their presence by installing software to deliberately hide 
their presence, some use kernel modules to accomplish this. Such an instance of a 
worm would not be covered by the above definition. 
 
1.2.2 Worm history and Taxonomy 
The concept of a worm program that spreads itself from machine to machine was 
apparently first described by John Brunner in 1975 in his book The Shockwave Rider. 
He called these programs tapeworms that lived “inside” the computers and spread 
themselves to other machines. In 1979-1981, researchers at Xerox PARC built and 
experimented with worm programs [3]. The worms built at PARC were designed to 
travel from machine to machine and do useful work in a distributed environment. They 
were not used at that time to break into systems, researchers soon developed worms 
that could harness under utilized computing resources. Furthermore, the possibility of a 
malicious worm such as the Morris worm became after an accident with the worm at 
Xerox PARC. Table 1.1 shows a generalized lineage of many of the worms which have 





Worm Discovery Date Distinction 
Morris/Internet Nov. 1988 The first significant worm. Exploited multiple 
vulnerabilities 
mIRC Script.ini Dec. 1997 Attacks users of the IRC client mRC. 
Melissa Mar. 1999 It shut down Internet mail systems. It spread on word 
processor 
Love Letter May  2000 A VBScript worm that spread largely via e-mail as a 
chain letter. 
Leaves Jun. 2001 Using the installed backdoor program to upload 
itself. 
Code Red Jul. 2001 The self-replicating malicious code that exploits a 
known vulnerability in Microsoft IIS servers. 
Code Red II Aug. 2001 It causes system level compromise and leaves a 
backdoor on certain machines running Windows 
2000. 
Nimda Sept. 2001 A hybrid windows worm – attacked client-to-client, 
server-to-server, client-to-server, and ser-to-client. 
SQL Snake May 2002 Internet worm targeting Microsoft SQL servers with 
TCP port 1433.  
Sapphire/Slammer Jan. 2003 Using a single UDP packet for explosive growth 
W32/Blaster Aug. 2003 It exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft's DCOM RPC 
interface using TCP port 135 
 
Table 1.1: Traditional worms of Note [3] 
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1.2.3 A Worm Spreading 
Now we describe how a worm spreads on Internet and attacks many systems. We 
explain the worm spreading techniques with one of malicious worms such as 
Sapphire/Slammer worm. The Sapphire/Slammer worm (also called Slammer) was the 
fastest computer worm in history [3]. As it began spreading throughout the Internet on 
January 25, 2003, it doubled in size every 8.5 seconds. It infected more than 90 percent 
of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes. Slammer exploited buffer overflow vulnerability 
in computers on the Internet running Microsoft's SQL Server. This weakness in an 
underlying indexing service was discovered in July 2002;Microsoft released a patch for 
the vulnerability before it was announced. The worm infected at least 75,000 hosts, and 
caused network outages and significant disruption of financial, transportation, and 
government institutions. 
Propagation speed of Slammer worm was very fast: The worm achieved its full 
scanning rate (over 55 million scans per second) after approximately three minutes, 
after which the rate of growth slowed down because significant portions of the network 
did not have enough bandwidth to allow it to operate. Most vulnerable machines were 
infected within 10 minutes of the worm's release. By comparison, it was faster than the 
Code Red worm, which infected over 359,000 hosts on July 19th, 2001 [4]. While 
Slammer did not contain a malicious payload, it caused considerable harm simply by 
overloading networks and taking database servers out of operation. Many individual 
sites lost connectivity as their access bandwidth was saturated by local copies of the 
worm and there were several reports of Internet backbone disruption. In other words, if 
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the worm had carried a malicious payload, it could have attacked a more widespread 
vulnerability and the effects would likely have been more severe.  
Slammer's spreading strategy is based on random scanning - it selects IP addresses 
at random to infect, eventually finding all susceptible hosts. Random scanning worms 
initially spread exponentially rapidly, but the rapid infection of new hosts becomes less 
effective as the worm spends more effort retrying addresses that are either already 
infected or immune.  
Slammer spread nearly two orders of magnitude faster than Code Red, yet it 
probably infected fewer machines. Both worms used the same basic strategy of 
scanning to find vulnerable machines and then transferring the exploitive payload; they 
differed in their scanning constraints. While Code Red was latency limited, Slammer 
was bandwidth-limited. Slammer contains a simple, fast scanner in a small worm with 
a total size of only 376 bytes. This can be contrasted with the 4kb size of Code Red, or 
the 60kb size of Nimda. Previous scanning worms, such as Code Red, spread via many 
threads, each invoking connect() to probe random addresses. Thus each thread's 
scanning rate was limited by network latency, the time required to transmit a TCP-
SYN packet and wait for a response or timeout. In contrast, Slammer's scanner was 
limited by each compromised machine's bandwidth to the Internet. Since the SQL 
Server vulnerability was exploitable using a single packet to UDP port 1434, the worm 
was able to send these scans without requiring a response from the potential victim. 
Slammer was frequently limited by the access bandwidth to the Internet rather than its 
own ability to generate new copies of itself. The Slammer worm's scanning technique 
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was so aggressive that it quickly interfered with its own growth. Consequently, the rate 
of growth from later infections was reduced since these instances were forced to 
compete with existing infections for scarce bandwidth. Thus Slammer worm achieved 
its maximum Internet-wide scanning rate within minutes.  
The following is the procedure of what the worm's payload is doing after infection: 
 
1. Retrieves the address of GetProcAddress and Loadlibrary from the IAT in 
sqlsort.dll. 
2. Calls gettickcount, and uses returned count as a pseudo-random seed 
3. Creates a UDP socket 
4. Performs a simple pseudo random number generation using the returned 
gettickcount value to generate an IP Address that will later be used as the target. 
5. Send worm payload in a SQL Server Resolution Service request to the pseudo 
random target address, on port 1434 (UDP). 
6. Return back and continue generating new pseudo random addresses. 
 
In general, the response to Slammer was quick. Within an hour, many sites began 
filtering all UDP packets with a destination port of 1434. Slammer represents the 
idealized situation for network-based filtering: the worm was easily distinguished by a 
signature that is readily filterable on current hardware and it attacked                            
a port that is not generally used for critical Internet communication. Thus almost all 
traffic blocked by these filters represents worm-scanning traffic. If the worm had 
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exploited vulnerability in a commonly used service (e.g. DNS at UDP port 53 or HTTP 
at TCP port 80), such filtering could have caused significant disruption to legitimate 
traffic with resulting denial-of-service more harmful than the worm itself. 
 
1.2.4 Worm Detection 
In this section we attempt to illustrate one of the methods of detecting worms using 
signature-based detection which is called pattern matching. We are interested in 
network payload signature that deals with packet headers and packet payloads, as is 
used in network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) [26]. The detection method used 
by NIDS engines perform an evaluation of packet contents received from the network. 
This can include matching signatures based on payload contents measured by string 
comparison, application protocol analysis, or network characteristics. 
 
Signature-based detection 
Signature-based detection is the method of analyzing the content of captured data to 
detect the present of known strings. These signatures are kept in a database and are 
derived from the content of known malicious files. These files are typically the 
executable programs associated with worms. 
The strength of signature-based detection is that the behavior of one instance of 
malicious worm is representative of all instances. This means that by detecting one 
node of the worm, the behavior of all nodes that are compromised by the worm can be 
reliably predicted. However, this signature-based detection also has several weaknesses. 
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One of drawback is that they rarely can be used to detect a new worm. Only after an 
attack is known, it can be used to detect a worm. Another of drawback is that it is hard 
to keep up with variants of worms and viruses. 
 
Worm Signature 
Worms typically have distinctive signatures as they attack other hosts on the network. 
By building up a library of known malicious signatures, a network monitor can alert an 
administrator to the presence and activity of a worm. 
In case of the Code Red worm, a distinctive request is made to the target server that 
contained the exploit as well as the malicious executable. By examining packets 
observed passively on the network, a detection system can identify Code Red worm 
activity. The largest problem with this signature for Code Red is its size. This signature 
is more than 100 bytes in length and must be fully matched against to successfully 
detect the worm’s traffic. If this payload is fragmented due to network transmission 
sizes, the larger signature will not match the smaller payloads in the fragments. 
There are numerous ways to monitor our network and protect it from Internet 
worms. For instance, companies commonly use a firewall for network protection. 
Although firewall logs often provide a lot of information regarding intrusion attempts, 
sometimes they contain too much data to solve the problem quickly. Some companies 
also use intrusion detection systems (IDSs) on border routers to monitor incoming 
traffic for patterns that indicate specific intrusion attempts. Worms that infect internal 
systems behind a firewall may be difficult to isolate since firewalls and intrusion 
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detection systems are used primarily on borders with the Internet, rather than on 
internal networks. 
 
1.3 Epidemiological Models 
Epidemiological models have traditionally been used to understand and model the 
spread of biological infectious diseases [9, 10]. Furthermore, in the area of virus and 
worm modeling, many studies have employed simple epidemiological models to 
understand general characteristics of worm’s propagation [5, 8]. In this section we 
introduce two classical epidemiological models. 
 
1.3.1 SIS model  
Let S(t) be the number of susceptible individuals at time t, and let I(t) be the number of 
infected individuals. For an SIS model, infected individuals return to the susceptible 
class on recovery because the disease confers no immunity against re-infection. The 




dS δβ +−=        (1.1) 
ISI
dt
dI δβ −=  
 
Let's briefly explore the meaning of these terms. 
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• The βSI term is understood as follows: An average infected individual makes 
contact sufficient to infect βN others per unit time. Also, the probability that a 
given individual that each infected individual comes in contact with is 
susceptible is S/N. Thus, each infected individual causes (βN)(S/N) = βS 
infections per unit time. Therefore, infected individuals, I, cause a total number 
of infections per unit time of βSI.  
• The δI term is even simpler to understand: δ is the fraction of infected 
individuals who recover (and re-enter the susceptible class) per unit time. 
 




        (1.2) 
Therefore, 
S + I = N is constant. 
 
1.3.2 SIR model 
The SIR model has been proposed by Kermack and McKendrick who considered the 
removal process of infected individuals [8]. We divide the population into three classes 
S, I, and R. The SIR model is very similar to the SIS model except that recovered 
individuals return to class R instead of passing to class S through immunization against 
infection. R(t) denotes the number of individuals who have been infected and then 
removed from the possibility of being infected again or of spreading infection. 
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dS β−=  
ISI
dt
dI αβ −=     (1.3) 
I
dt
dR α=  
 
where β is the infection rate; α is the rate of removal. 
We note that N = S + I + R. 
 
1.4 Optimal control problem 
Optimal control can be regarded as one of the possible methodologies of the control 
system’s design. The most general optimal control problem is described by four types 
of data: (1) system constraints, (2) the initial state and the target state, (3) the class of 
admissible controllers, and (4) the cost functional. We attempt to investigate such an 
optimal control problem of minimizing the cost function described in chapter 4. The 
objective of our optimal control problem is to determine the control variables that will 





1.4.1 Control System Model 
We consider a control problem where based on a system model we have to determine 
the control inputs u(t) such that the system behavior x(t) meets our requirements as 












  Figure 1.1: Control and behavior related by a system model 
 
In case of optimal control we have a mathematical system model, 
 
),,(x tuxf=& ,    x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm   (1.4) 
 
A formal statement of the control problem is comprised of the state variable, the 
control variable, time, a set of differential equations, the determination of terminal time, 
and the objective function.  
Time, t, is measured in continuous units and is defined over the relevant interval from 
initial time t0, which is typically given, to terminal time t1, which must often be 
determined. Thus the relevant interval is: t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 
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At any time t in the relevant interval the state of the system is characterized by n real 
numbers, , called state variable, and summarized by the state vector: )(),...,(),( 21 txtxtx n
 
x(t) = ))(),...,(),(( 21 ′txtxtx n ,     (1.5) 
 
is a continuous vector valued function of time, the value of which at any time t in the 
relevant interval is the state vector. The initial state, x(t0) = x0, is assumed given, and 
the terminal state, x(t1) = x1, must often be determined. 
At any time t in the relevant interval the controls to be made are characterized by r real 
numbers, , called control variables and summarized by the control 
vector: 
)(),...,(),( 21 tututu r
 
u(t) = ))(),...,(),(( 21 ′tututu r ,     (1.6) 
 
is a continuous vector valued function of time, the value of which at any time t in the 
relevant interval is the control vector. 
The state trajectory {x(t)} is characterized by a set of n differential equations giving the 
time rate of change of each state variable as a function of the state variables, the control 
variables, and time: 
 
)(tx& = f(x(t), u(t), t),     (1.7) 
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Or, written out in full: 
 
):)(),...,(),();(),...,(),(()()( 2121 ttutututxtxtxftxt rnjjdt
dxj == & ,  j = 1, 2, …, n,    (1.8) 
 
where each of the n functions  is assumed given and 
continuously differentiable. If the differential equations do not depend explicitly on the 
time then the equations are autonomous. 
)(),...,(),( 21 LLL nfff
The behavior of system is fully determined by x(t). Based on these state and control 
variables, an optimal control u*(t) can be computed which minimizes the cost function 
C(u(t)). So optimal relates to the system model and cost function. Associated to the 





















Now we define the general form of optimal control problem as follows; 
Given the system, 
),,...,,,...,( 11 tuuxxfx mnii =& ,  i = 1, …, n, 
Or in vector form 
x&  = f(x, u, t), 
Where 
   x = ),...,( 1 ′nxx  and  u =  ),...,( 1 ′muu
with the known initial condition 
   x(t0) = x0
and the final condition that we wish to reach is x1 ∈ Rn. x1 is often called the target 
point, and may or may not be given. 
Find the optimal control u*(t) that minimizes the cost function  
 






where f0 is a given continuous real-valued function, C(u*) ≤ C(u) for all u.  
 
1.4.2 Calculus of Variations 
Calculus variations are suitable for solving linear or nonlinear optimal control 
problems with linear or nonlinear boundary conditions [56, 57]. Basically, it is a 
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collection of many different analytical methods and they are discussed differently from 
book to book. Here, a typical approach which leads to more general and widely used 
modern theories is introduced. 
 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle is one of approaches to solve the optimal control 
problem. Pontryagin’s maximum principle serves to identify on optimal path or 
trajectory. If we define x(t) to represent the state of system at time t and u(t) represents 
the control at time t, then the optimal control problem is to find trajectory {x(t)} by 
choosing a set {u(t)} of controls so as to maximize or minimize some objective 
function. The maximum principle therefore has been the basic approach to computing 
optimal controls in many important problems in mathematics, engineering, and 
economics. 
The general formula of the maximum principle problem is: 
 










    s.t. )( t u, x,fx =&  
    x(t0) = x0  for t = 0 is initial point 
    x(t1) = x1  for t = T is the final state 
    {u(t)}   the control trajectory t0 ≤ t ≤ t1
Ω   a set of all admissible controls 
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where F(⋅⋅⋅) and f(⋅⋅⋅) are given continuously differentiable functions; and {u(t)} must 
belong to the given control set Ω. The maximum principle can be considered the 
extension of the method of Lagrange multipliers to optimal control problems. We 
introduce new variables, called costate variables, are the dynamic equivalents of the 
Lagrange multipliers of maximization problems: 
 
    ϕ(t) = (ϕ1(t), ϕ2(t), …, ϕn(t))             (1.11) 
 
It also notes that each of the costate variables corresponds to one of the differential 
equations of motion and in general varies over time. 
 The next step is to define a Lagrangian function which equals the expression to be 
maximized plus the inner product of the Lagrange multiplier vector and the constraints. 
The inner product is properly treated under the integral sign, the Lagrangian expression 
being: 
 















To develop the necessary conditions, note that the term- )()( tt x&ϕ in equation (1.12) can 
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Hamiltonian function 
From equation (1.13) the first two expressions under the integral sign are defined to be 
the Hamiltonian function: 
 
    H(x, u, ϕ, t) ≡ F(x, u, t) + ϕf(x, u, t)   (1.14) 
 
That is, the Hamiltonian function (called Hamiltonian) is defined as the sum of the 
intermediate function (integrand) of the objective functional plus inner product of the 
vector of costate variables and the vector of functions defining the rate of change of the 
state variables. 
For a maximum it is necessary that the change in the Lagrangian function must hold for 
a change in the control trajectory {∆u(t)}, that: 
 




H , t0 ≤ t ≤ t1    (1.15) 
Necessary condition equation (1.15) states that the Hamiltonian function is maximized 
by choice of the control variables at each point along the optimal trajectory {u*(t)}. 
To summarize, the maximum principle technique involves adding to the problem n 




    H(x, u, ϕ, t) ≡ F(x, u, t) + ϕf(x, u, t)            (1.16) 
 
and solving for trajectories {u(t)}, {ϕ(t)}, and {x(t)} satisfying. 
 




0 ≤ t ≤ t1            (1.17) 




Hx& , x(t0) = x0






The form of the solution for the optimal control problem often follows readily from the 
maximization of Hamiltonian, which usually gives the optimal control variables not as 
functions of time but rather as functions of the costate variables. 
In particular, if the problem is autonomous in that both F(⋅⋅⋅) and f(⋅⋅⋅) show no 
explicit dependence on time then the Hamiltonian shows no explicit dependence on 
time and, since dH / dt = 0, along the optimal trajectory the value of Hamiltonian is 
constant over time. Another advantage is that Hamiltonian functions are easier to solve 






1.5 Organization and Contribution of the dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces several trace 
back techniques and defines a trace back problem more formally. We present a simple 
and efficient algorithm for detecting the source of attack in a network. The algorithm 
uses the dynamic centroid decomposition technique to select nodes for monitoring 
packets to identify an attack packet. Advantage of the algorithm requires limited 
resources and does not require change in Internet protocols. Contribution of our work 
is to identify the set of routers that are requested to log, mark, or authenticate 
depending upon the type of attack.  The number of routers identified for this task will 
be kept at a minimum yet sufficient to reduce the burden on the routers. In chapter 3, 
we describe the two classical simple epidemic models and an extended model, allowing 
for loss of immunity that causes recovered hosts to become susceptible again. With real 
Internet topology data, we find that there are two effective factors that influence 
Internet worm propagation: temporary immunization time and network delays. We note 
that our simulation results can explain how fast a virulent worm can spread and suggest 
effective mechanisms to monitor and defend against the propagation of worms. It also 
shows that we can find location(s) in the network that when quarantined would slow 
down the rage of spread. In chapter 4, we attempt to investigate a new approach to such 
optimal control problems of minimizing the cost of infection which can be interpreted 
as the network delay. Furthermore, we define the objective of minimizing the total cost 
of infection and derive the necessary conditions for our cost optimization problem 
which is solved numerically. We show that our simulation results can answer the 
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question of how many nodes needed to filter and when to start a filtering treatment, and 
this treatment of worm infection is very effective for reducing the spread of worm 


























On Intrusion Source Identification 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Network forensics is the science of analysis and detection of network based intrusions, 
including evidence gathering, and locating and isolating intruder(s). A well-known 
network based attack on computing resources is the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
wherein the intruder sends several requests to the server so as to overwhelm the server 
and prevent it from serving legitimate user requests. The DoS attack can be either from 
a single intruder, a distributed set of intruders, or a distributed set of compromised 
hosts. Attacks of this nature can be connection-oriented involving TCP’s three-way 
handshake protocol or connectionless that uses UDP packets. The source of the packets 
to the victim can be from the real intruder with possibly spoofed source IP address in 
the packets, or from the compromised machine(s). DoS attacks are considered 
continuous in the sense that a continuous stream of packets is sent from the intruder(s) 
 
26
or the compromised machine(s) to the victim. An example of a non-continuous attack 
is the SQL Slammer attack wherein a single UDP packet contains the necessary code to 
attack SQL servers running on port 1434. 
The source identification or the trace back problem deals with identifying the 
source of the intruder after the intrusion has been detected. Solutions to the trace back 
problem involve enabling the routers to monitor intruder’s packets (packets that have a 
specific signature that has been singled out as a packet(s) that caused the intrusion) and 
executing a detection algorithm based on the information collected from the routers. 
For example, in packet marking schemes proposed in the literature, addresses of 
routers through which the packets are routed are added to the packet. When the victim 
(where the intrusion has occurred) gets the intruder’s packets with addresses marked in 
them, it can reconstruct the path of the intruder’s packets all the way to the source. If 
the source address is spoofed by the intruder, then the marking system will trace the 
origin of the packet all the way to the router that is uncompromised and closest to the 
source.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents overviews of 
trace back techniques and their limitations and problems. Section 2.3 reviews recent 
solutions for trace back against DoS attacks. Section 2.4 discusses the trace back 
problem more formally and provides assumptions used by our detection system. 
Section 2.5 presents an algorithm that will use a minimal amount of network resources 
to either detect the sources of attack or perform quarantine operation that will isolate 
portions of the network from possible attacks. The conclusions and future work is 




Recently, so many network security communities have made reasonably good progress 
in the development of attack prevention and intrusion detection systems for protecting 
hosts against network-based attacks launched remotely by attackers. However, because 
of the design of Internet Protocol (IP), back tracking the source of such attacks 
remains relatively difficult. Furthermore, it is difficult to eliminate spoofed packets in 
mounting denial of service (DoS) attacks on the Internet. This section describes 
techniques for tracing internet packets with spoofed source addresses back to their 
point of origin and presents their limitations and problems. 
 
2.2.1 Overview of Trace back problems 
A simple mechanism to prevent spoofed packets from leaving the subnet is to use 
Egress filtering wherein every packet’s source address is examined to make sure that 
its source address matches the subnet from which the packet originated. Such internal 
policing can stop spoofed packets from entering the Internet, but this scheme will be 
beneficial only when all border routers cooperate. Certainly, not all ISP’s and large 
networks can use Egress filtering [54]. Egress filtering cannot help in case of 
compromised machines sending attack packets with legitimate source addresses. Given 
the fact that some routers perform Egress filtering while others do not, the authenticity 
of the source IP address of the attack packet is still in doubt.   
Yet another scheme to determine the subnet from which the attack packet originates 
is to force the border router at the subnet to mark the packet with its IP address. Such a 
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scheme would allow the victim to trace the attack packet closest to the subnet level and 
the border router at the subnet can be further instructed to block all the packets destined 
for the victim. This will work only when we assume that the subnet’s router is not 
compromised.  Clearly, this scheme adds additional complexity to the packet structure 
and incurs additional network bandwidth.    
In order to trace back spoofed attack packets, the routers that border the subnets 
attached to the victim have to be requested to monitor packets. Not only the number of 
such routers can be very large, but needs also to be made an unreasonable assumption 
of a continuous stream of spoofed attack packets. The problem is further compounded 
if the attached border routers belong to different Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
since all of them have to cooperate. In any case, a desirable solution is to perform 
logging of packets using SYSLOG or NETFLOW. These logging techniques are based 
on efficient storage mechanism such as a bloom filtering [33] and they provide tools 
for determining if a packet with a specific signature visited that router. These 
techniques range from simple matching to intelligent data mining [26, 32]. Placing 
effective monitors on every possible location in the network or marking every possible 
packet by all the routers is highly cost prohibitive and a severe drain on resources. For 
example, assuming that all packets through routers are logged, the victim can send a 
copy of the attack packet to all the SYSLOG or NETFLOW databases to be searched. 
Routers or its associated SYSLOG database that report the presence of the packet can 
“ring an alarm” and new routers attached to the “ringing” routers can be searched. To 
avoid resource draining process of logging every packet, the routers can be made to log 
packets on demand by the victim. A victim will request such a longer upon receiving 
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attack packets. The routers that “ring” and are farthest away from the victim would be 
requested to block the packets destined for the victim until the victim recovers. Clearly, 
the logging mechanism is very effective in finding source of non-continuous attacks. 
A mechanism using IPSec security associations can be used to authenticate packets 
received from a router. For example, if a victim v would like to determine whether an 
intruder packet is routed from a particular router say R, then either v or the router 
closest to v can establish an IPSec with R. The premise of the approach is that if an 
attack packet has been correctly authenticated by a certain router R, the attack packet 
must have transited that router. Therefore, iteratively building security associations 
with routers at increasing distances from the victim will allow one to perform a secure 
trace route that will trace the attack packet to the router closest to it, even if the attacker 
used spoofed IP addresses. The technique proposed in this chapter will reduce the 
number of associations that need to be established to trace the router closest to the 
source. 
 
2.2.2 Types of Attacks 
Based on the discussion above we recognize that technique of logging, packet marking, 
or IPSec authentication is dependent on the type of attack. In general, the type to be 
used often depends on the attacker's motives and aims. Types of attacks can be 
classified as follows: 
Destructive – Attacks which destroy the ability of the device to function, such 
as deleting or changing configuration information or power interruptions.  
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Resource consumption – Attacks which degrade the ability of the device to 
function, such as opening many simultaneous connections to the single device.  
 
Bandwidth consumption – Attacks which attempt to overwhelm all available 
bandwidth capacity of the network device. 
 
Furthermore, these attack types include continuous and non-continuous versions of 
single intruder and multiple intruders. For example, in the case of single intruder 
continuous attack the victim can request certain routers to mark the packets with the IP 
address in order to determine the route the packets take. For non-continuous attack 
proactive logging of packet information by certain routers would be very beneficial. A 
victim that sees a regular non-continuous attack can request a router to log the packets 
in a reactive sense. Our goal is to identify the set of routers that are requested to log, 
mark, or authenticate depending upon the type of attack. The number of routers 
identified for this task will be kept at a minimum yet sufficient lead to reduce the 
burden on the routers.  
 
2.3 Recent Solutions for Trace back 
Several types of DoS attacks have been identified [23, 24, 25], with the most basic DoS 
attack demanding more resources than the target system or network can supply. 
Resources may be network bandwidth, file system space, processes, or network 
connections [24]. While host-based DoS attacks are more easily traced and managed, 
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network-based DoS attacks which exploit weaknesses of the TCP/IP protocol suite [30], 
represent a more subtle and difficult threat [24, 34]. Network-based DoS attacks 
employ spoofing to forge the source address, and thereby hide identity of the physical 
source [29]. Previous works have focused on detecting DoS attacks and mitigating their 
detrimental impact upon the victim [27, 28]. 
A number of recent works have studied source identification (also called IP trace 
back [34]) which spans a range of techniques with their individual pros and cons. IP 
trace back is to identify the origin of sequential IP packets when the source IP 
addresses of these packets are spoofed. IP trace back is usually performed at the 
network layer, with the help of routers and gateways. 
 
Link Testing  
In link testing the identification of the physical source of an attack is done by tracing it 
back hop-by-hop through the network MAC addresses [39]. Trace back is typically 
performed manually, and is recursively repeated at the upstream router until the 
originating host is reached. The drawbacks of link testing include multiple branch 
points, slow trace back during an attack, communication overhead due to message 
exchange, and administrative constraints between network operators [39]. In behavioral 
monitoring [24], the likely behavior of an attacker during a DoS attack is monitored to 
identify the source. For example, an attacker may perform DNS requests to resolve the 
name of the target host which may not be resident in its local name server’s cache. 
During a DoS attack, an attacker may try to gauge the impact of the attack using 
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various service requests including Web and ICMP echo requests. Logging of such 
events and activities can reveal information about the attacker’s source.  
 
Ingress Filtering 
Packet filtering is a network mechanism for controlling what data can flow to and from 
a network affected routers or firewalls [42]. Filtering decisions, typically, are made 
based on packet content including source/destination addresses and port numbers. As a 
means of preventing network-based DoS attacks, ingress filtering in border gateways 
has been proposed for limiting IP source address spoofing [37, 38]. Ingress filtering 
requires a prolonged period to be broadly deployed on the Internet.  
 
Probabilistic Packets Marking (PPM) 
In packet-based trace back, packets are marked with the addresses of intermediate 
routers, in some sense, an inverse operation of source routing and similar to the IP 
Record Route option [31]. The victim uses information inscribed in packets to trace the 
attack back to its source. In this method, overhead in the form of variable-length 
marking fields that grow with path length, or traffic overhead due to extra messaging 
packets is incurred.  
Probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [34, 35, 36] has been proposed for achieving 
space efficiency in the form of constant marking field and processing efficiency in the 
form of minimal router support. The basic idea of the approach is that routers prob-
abilistically encode partial path information into the packets during forwarding and try 
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to reconstruct the complete path from the packets that contain the marking. In spite of 
its efficiency properties, PPM has several drawbacks: packet storage requirements and 
high router overhead to record the path information. For a large amount of packets, it 
may result in unnecessary fragmentation. To reduce the resource overhead, a hash-
based technique was proposed to store the information into 16-bit IP Identification 
field used for fragmentation in the IP header. However, the ID field of IP header can 
not be modified if either fragmentation is necessary or IPSec authentication is provided. 
In addition, it is necessary for a victim to accumulate huge amount of data in order to 
determine true attack path. Improved marking schemes including authentication were 
studied in [35]. 
 
IPSec authentication and encryption  
Chang, et al [43, 44] proposed a security management framework, DECIDUOUS 
(Decentralized Source Identification for Network-Based Intrusions), to securely 
identify attack sources by using existing network security protocols and services, 
specifically IPSec authentication and encryption services. With this method, when an 
attack is detected, the Internet key exchange (IKE) protocol establishes IPsec security 
associations (SAs) between the target host and some routers in the administrative 
domain (for example, autonomous system boundary routers). Routers at the SA ends 
add an IPsec header and a tunnel IP header containing the router’s IP address to 
traversing packets. If the attack continues and one of the established SAs authenticates 
a subsequent attack packet, the attack must come from a network beyond the 
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corresponding router. The receiver checks the source IP address of the tunnel IP header 
to find out which routers the attack packet traversed. Repeating this process recursively, 
the receiver finally reaches the attack source. Because this technique uses existing 
IPsec and IKE protocols, implementing a new protocol for tracing is unnecessary. 
 
ICMP Trace back Message (iTrace)  
ICMP trace back proposes to introduce a new message “ICMP trace back” (or an 
iTrace message) so that routers can generate iTrace messages to help the victim or its 
upstream ISP to identify the source of spoofed IP packets [40]. For example, routers 
would be modified to randomly (for example, one trace back message for every 20,000 
packets) generate a trace back message about a packet and send it to the packet’s 
destination. Each trace back message would provide authenticated information about 
the packet being traced, what time it was sent, where it came from, where it went. With 
enough trace back messages from enough routers, a network manager could find the 
source of a spoofed flow. Of course, this would require that the Internet routers would 
have to be modified to support the new ICMP trace back. An intention-driven iTrace is 
also introduced to reduce unnecessary iTrace messages and thus improve the 
performance of iTrace systems [41].  
 
Hop-by-hop Input Debugging 
Robert Stone’s CenterTrack uses an overlay network of IP tunnels to selectively 
reroute suspicious datagrams from edge routers to special tracking routers [45]. The 
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tracking router can determine the ingress edge router by noting the tunnel on which the 
packet arrived. The tracking router can inspect the suspicious datagram and then either 
drop it or forward it. The scheme permits rerouting flooding packets and can determine 
the ingress point on the enterprise network. 
 
Logging and Storage 
Snoeren et al [46] describe a hash based technique and an implementation of digest 
tables using space-efficient data structures known as Bloom filters; it records packet 
digests for recently forwarded traffic within the network and reconstructs the attack 
paths with these digests. A software engine called Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) 
that uses the packet digests is proposed in [46]. Using the SPIE environment, it has 
been shown that tracing attacks that use single packet rather than a series of packets is 
feasible with low storage requirements. The packet digest is computed over the 
invariant bytes of a packet header and the first 8 bytes of payload. This approach is 
based on the assumption that this packet digest will not be frequently modified by a 
packet transform. However, if the invariant portion of a packet header is used and 
modified frequently to store extended information, then this assumption is infeasible. 
In this case, packet transformations will occur frequently and result in resource 






2.4 Trace back: Centroid Approach 
Definition 2.1 (Attack paths and tree): The attack propagation model of a network is 
given by the undirected network G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set 
of edges. The set of nodes V could be further partitioned into end systems and routers. 
The edges denote physical links between elements in V. Let Ai ∈ V denote the potential 
attack source, and let Vt ∈ V \ Ai denote the victim. In case of a single attacker, |Ai| = 1, 
and the path Ρi = ( Ai, R1, R2, …, Rd, Vt) composed of d routers R1, …,  Rd, an attacker 
Ai, and a victim Vt is called an attack path. In other words, an attack path from Ai is the 
sequential route that the attack packet has traversed between Ai and Vt.  If |Ai| > 1, then 
we have distributed DoS attack (DDoS) wherein the attack paths are joined together to 
form an attack tree rooted at the victim.                                                                          ■ 
 
Definition 2.2 (Trace back Problem): Let G′ = (V′, E′ ) be an attack network of G, 
where V′ represents the set of nodes associated with attack path(s) and edge (u, v) ∈ E′ 
represents a link on which an attack at u∈ V′ propagates to v∈ V′. In other words, the 
removal of vertices Vi not associated with attack path(s) from the network G results in 
the induced attack network G′ , e.g., from figure 2.1 we obtain an attack network G′ 
containing two attack paths, P2 = (A2, R6, R3, R2, R1, Vt) and P3 = (A3, R7, R4, R2, R1, 
Vt) by removal of nodes A1 and R5. The trace back problem is to construct an attack 
network G′ containing the attack path(s) and the associated attack source(s) for each 










Figure 2.1: Attack paths: (A2, R6, R3, R2, R1, Vt) and (A3, R7, R4, R2, R1, Vt).   
The attack paths form an attack tree is shown above. 
 
2.4.1 Assumptions 
We state in the following the assumptions on the mode and operations pertaining to the 
attack on the victim by the intruder(s). 
 
1. Attackers may generate any packet 
2. Attacker may disguise its IP source address 
3. Routers are both CPU and memory limited 
4. Routers are not widely compromised 
5. Routers always choose the shortest routes with least hops to forward packets 
6. In the case of continuous attack (like the DoS), the route taken by the attack 




The assumption that routers always select a shortest path to forward packets is 
probably the fundamental property of our proposed algorithm. Routing path selection 
in several deployed routing protocols is based on well-known shortest path algorithms. 
It follows that packets from an attacker to victim must be transmitted through the 
shortest path. The final assumption that routing would be systemically stable until an 
efficient tracing system determines the attack source is the most controversial. Paxson 
[47] states that two packets sent by the two same end hosts may take different 
directions of the Internet paths due to network congestion. Labovitz et al. [48] have 
also shown the routing instability from BGP routing messages. However, it is very 
difficult for any tracing system to seek to determine attack source with multiple attack 
paths. Chinoy [49] measured that almost 90% of the EGP routing updates in the 
NFSNET system of networks contained close to 0% new information (whereas EGP 
updates occur every 3 minutes). Furthermore, Govindan and Reddy [50] used a year's 
worth of inter-domain routing traces collected in 1994-95 and analyzed the Internet 
inter-domain topology, its routing stability behavior. Shaikh and Kalampokas [51] have 
performed extensive experimentation and developed analytical models to capture the 
stability and robustness properties of routing protocols in congested networks. It shows 
that the path through which packets are transmitted between two end hosts does not 
change frequently despite the growth of the topology. As a result, routing of multiple 
attack packets should be stable during the period of the trace time to identify the attack 
source. These last two assumptions motivate us to look for a scheme which transfers a 
general network topology to a terminal network (described in next section) of the 
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network in order to simplify network topology and reduce the amount of network 
resources required to perform trace back. 
 
2.4.2 Terminal Nodes 
Terminal nodes are routers on the network that see large amount of network traffic.  
Typically border routers that connect autonomous areas to the rest of the Internet and 
Internet core routers experience heavy network traffic. At the subnet level, these are 
routers that connect one subnet to the other as they join to form the autonomous system.  
Our proposed solution for the trace back problem makes use of these terminal nodes 
wherein logging, marking, or IPSec association is performed. The number of terminal 
nodes can be large considering the fact that there are over 2 million core routers.   
Consider the Abilene Network which is an Internet2 high-performance backbone 
network that connects hundreds of end users that range from universities, research labs, 
and technology companies. The structure of the Abilene network is shown in figure 2.2.  
Traffic from the west coast can reach the east coast through a combination of two 
routers selected one each from sets {Kansas City, Houston} and {Indianapolis, 
Atlanta}. These routers experience plenty of traffic compared with routers at the edges 
say Seattle for example. Our goal is to identify these routers based on the topology of 
the network and use these nodes to monitor intruder packets. As a first step, we will 
imagine that our network is a set of glued bi-connected components. The bi-connected 
components of the Internet2 backbone network are {Sunnyvale, Seattle, Denver}, 

















































































Figure 2.2: Abilene Network 
 
Atlanta, Indianapolis}, and {Indianapolis, Atlanta, Washington, New York City, 
Chicago}. 
The nodes that connect one bi-connected component with the other are terminal 
nodes and traffic through these terminal nodes are generally higher compared with 
other nodes. In figure 2.2 the terminal nodes are Sunnyvale, Denver, Kansas City, 
Houston, Atlanta, and Indianapolis. 
In the next subsection, we present an algorithmic technique to recognize terminal 





2.4.3 Terminal Network 
The approaches presented for trace back problems all involve cooperation of 
intermediate routers in the network. Our main goal is to reduce the number of 
intermediate routers that participate in the trace back solutions. To this end, we identify 
a small number of set of nodes that are enough to complete the trace back based on the 
assumptions on the network and on its routing presented in section 2.4.1.  
Given a network G, we first construct a set of connected components that does not 
exceed the given size (number of nodes) t.  
 
 
Algorithm BCC (H, t) 
Input: The network H = (V, E) with nodes V and links E, and a size t. 
Output: A set of connected components. 
Begin 
1. If (H is a tree) Then 
2.  Return H 
3. Else 
4.  If (|H| < t) Then Return H 
5.  Test connectivity of H and let it be k. 
6.  Choose k nodes to make the network H disconnected. 




8.  Add the k nodes to each of the connected component Hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m with links  
 (p, q), where p is a cut node, q is a node in Hi, and (p, q) is a link in E.  
9.  Mark the k nodes of each connected component to indicate that they are 
 terminal nodes. 





The main idea behind this is that the intruder resides in a connected component and 
searching only the terminal vertices would lead us to that connected component. Let H 
be k connected with k ≥ 2. We need to identify k nodes whose removal will make the 
network not connected. The set of k vertices will be added to the set of terminal 
vertices.  
We will remove these k nodes and apply the above algorithm on each of the 
remaining connected component until either each component is 1-connected or its size 
does not exceed t. The larger the size of t faster the above algorithm will terminate. If t 
is equal to n, the number of nodes in the network, then the entire network will become 
a terminal network and hence more network resources have to be committed for the 
trace route problem. On the other hand if t is smaller, then the number of bi-connected 
components identified will be large and so will the number of terminal nodes. 




Definition 2.3 (Terminal Network): A terminal network TG = (V′, E′ ) of a network G 
is an edge weighted network that contains nodes {u, v} ∈ V′, where u and v are 
terminal nodes of G and link (u, v) ∈ E′, if and only if, nodes u and v belong to the 
same connected component that results after the execution of the algorithm BCC. The 
weight on the link (u, v) ∈ E′ is the shortest distance between vertices u and v in G.     ■ 
 
















     


























Figure 2.4: The terminal network of the network in Figure 2.3. The weights on the 
edges are the distances in terms of number of hops between the marked vertices in the 
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2.5 Detection Algorithm 
After the terminal network is constructed the single source shortest path tree starting 
with the terminal node that is closest to the victim is constructed from the terminal 
network. A single source shortest path tree is shown in figure 2.5. 
Considering the tree network as shown in figure 2.5, let node b be the router that is 
closest to the victim. Assume that we are dealing with a continuous attack from a 
single source. A straight forward track back approach works as follows. Assume that 
router k (in figure 2.5) is forwarding the attack packets. Node b without any knowledge 
first requests node a to mark the packets. This operation will be termed as placing an 
alarm at node a.  If the marked packets are not the attack packets, then it can request 
node c to mark the packets. Node b now will recognize that the attack packets are from 
node c (“ringing” node) and it will initiate a track back request to node c (for the 
subtree rooted at node c).  Node c will perform similar operations to that of node b 
until node k is reached. 
Clearly, this straight forward approach will require that all nodes mark the packets 
at one time or the other and hence is a severe drain of network resources. If we request 
more than one node to mark the packets simultaneously, then we can speed up the 
process of trace back, but it does not improve resource usage efficiency. In the case of 
a distributed DoS attack, there will be more than one ringing node that is on different 
paths from root to leaf nodes in the shortest path tree. For such cases, the trace back 
will be applied to each subtree rooted at the ringing nodes. In summary, for the 
continuous attack scenario, a given set of alarms is incrementally placed at more than 
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one location and depending on the ringing and non-ringing of the alarms the old alarms 
are removed and new alarms are placed.  Instead of working with the network in figure 
2.5, we can apply the same approach as above on the centroid tree.  Since the depth of 
the centroid tree is no more than O(logn), the trace back can be completed in O(logn) 
time.  This concept is explained in section 2.5.1. 
 
2.5.1 The Centroid Approach 
Our proposed algorithm requires a centroid decomposition technique on a tree network. 
Every tree T has a centroid consisting of either one vertex or two adjacent vertices [52].  
For each vertex v ∈ T of degree 2 or more, count the number of vertices in each of the 
subtrees emanating from v, and let nv be the maximum of these numbers. If the tree has 
n vertices it can be shown that either there is just one vertex v for which 2/)1( −≤ nnv  
or there are two adjacent vertices v and w for which nv = nw = n/2. We can determine a 
centroid of the tree T by repeatedly removing nodes of degree one until either a single 
vertex remains or an edge remains. A centroid decomposition is the process of 
repeatedly finding the centroids on subtrees obtained by removing every edge incident 
on the centroid.  Given a n-node tree the centroid decomposition can be completed in 
O(n) time [53].    
 
Observation 2.1 [in 53]: Given a tree T with n nodes, the size of each connected 




Observation 2.2: Based on Observation 2.1, it can be clearly seen that the depth of the 
centroid tree TC is O(logn).                                                                                              ■ 
 
A centroid tree TC of a tree T is obtained using the algorithm CentroidTree. 
 
Algorithm CentroidTree (T) 
Input: The tree network T. 
Output: The Centroid Tree of TC. 
Begin 
1. The centroid of T is the root r of the tree TC. 
2. let subtrees T1, T2, …, Tk be obtained by removing r from T; the centroids c1, 
c2, …, ck of the subtrees T1, T2, …, Tk, respectively are the children of r, 




The centroid decomposition process on a tree network and its corresponding centroid 
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Figure 2.6: (a) Find a centroid r in a tree T, (b) Find subtrees T1, T2, and T3 by 
removing r and the centroids c1, c2, and  c3 from each subtree, (c) construct a centroid 
tree Tc with node ‘r’ as the root of the tree 
 
2.5.2 The Algorithm 
The algorithm to perform the trace back assumes that preprocessing has been 
completed and the terminal network has been constructed. Once the victim is identified, 
then the router closest to it in the terminal network is chosen as the root of the single 
source shortest path tree as explained previously. The alarm is placed on the centroid or 
its neighbors as explained below. Depending on the ‘ringing’ and ‘non-ringing’ of the 
alarm the new set of alarms is placed on the centroid of the sub trees that remain after 
the previous centroid is removed. This process is continued until the terminal router 






Input: The network and the router closest to the victim 
Output: The router closest to the intruder 
Begin 
1. First construct the terminal network and find the single source shortest path tree 
T of the terminal network with the node in the terminal network closest to the 
victim as the root. 
2. Find the centroid of T and place an alarm either on the centroid or the neighbors 
of the centroid as specified in the more detailed description below. 
3. Determine the subtrees obtained after removing the centroid and if attack 
packets are discovered in a node v on which an is alarm is placed, then execute 
step 2) on a subtree Tv containing the node v. If there is more than one node 
alerting an attack, then choose the one that is farthest from the root of the tree. 




Based on observation 2.2 and the above algorithm, it is evident that the number of 
alarm placement steps is bounded by O(logn) for a n-node tree. Step 1) of the above 
algorithm can be constructed using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in O(m+nlogn) 










Intruder Node with a ringing alarm
Node with a non-ringing alarm
 
 
Figure 2.7: Alarms are placed on nodes a, c, d, and x and the ringing ones are d, and x.  
Node d is the closest to the intruder and the tree rooted at d is processed next. 
 
For step 2) of the algorithm, as pointed out earlier the centriod can be found in O(n) 
time and after we find the centroid we place the alarms as follows. Assuming that we 
have a large number of alarms available, we should place the alarms on the centroid 
and its neighbors.  
Figure 2.7 illustrates alarms and shows the ringing alarms based on the location of 
the intruder. For example, in figure 2.7, based on the position of the intruder the alarms 
placed on node x (the centroid) and nodes d will ring.  Node d is farthest from the 
victim and hence the subtree rooted at d will be chosen next and its centroid will be 
found. This process will continue until the terminal node closest to the intruder is found.  
If more than one such node d exists due to attacks from multiple sources, then each tree 





2.6 Concluding Remarks 
We have introduced several techniques for tracing internet packets with spoofed 
source addresses back to their origin of attacks. Even though those several proposals 
are worthy attempt to be applied in different tracing techniques for different attack 
types, there exist some practical limitations for implementation such as resource bound, 
modification of Internet infrastructure, and so on. 
In this chapter we have presented a simple and efficient algorithm for detecting the 
source of attack in a network. The algorithm uses the dynamic centroid decomposition 
technique to select routers for monitoring packets to identify the one with signatures of 
an attack packet. To simplify network topology and reduce the amount of network 
resources required to perform trace back, we need a scheme which transfers a general 
network topology to a terminal network of the network. 
In summary, we ensure that many of the existing trace back techniques can be used 
in our algorithm in order to obtain the minimal number of network entities on which 
alarms (or monitors) are placed to determine the source of attacks under more 
sophisticated attacks. In other words, our proposed solution for the trace back problem 
involves a very small fraction of routers wherein logging, marking, or IPSec 
association is performed. In addition, our proposal could serve as the basis for future 








Chapter 3  
Measurement and Analysis of Worm 




In the area of virus and worm modeling, many studies have employed simple 
epidemiological models to understand general characteristics of worm’s propagation. 
Epidemiologic propagation models have traditionally been used to understand and 
model the spread of biological infectious diseases [9, 10]. The time required for finding 
the target node to be infected and the rate of infection were assumed to be a constant in 
many propagation models proposed in the literature [5, 8]. A constant infection rate is 
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reasonable for modeling epidemics but may not be valid for real Internet viruses and 
worms. The reason is that most classical epidemic models are homogeneous, in the 
sense that an infected host is equally likely to infect any of the susceptible hosts while 
Internet is non-homogeneous. In addition, current propagation studies have not 
considered the real Internet topology data and exploited characteristics of the network 
topology.  
 
3.1.1 Immunization Defense of Worms 
Previous works on worm modeling neglect the impacts of multiple worm outbreaks on 
our computer networks. Nowadays, new network worms will continue to be created 
while the strains of old worms will continue to circulate around the Internet. Recently, 
the Blaster worm, known as MSBlast or LoveSAN, has infected an average of about 
2,500 new systems hourly running Microsoft operating systems that are unpatched for 
the so-called RPC vulnerability [16]. It is noted that a huge number of infected hosts is 
a substantial rate of infection, though the several hundred thousand hosts may be still 
infected by other old Internet worms including Slammer, Code Red and Nimda. In 
other words, many new viruses and worms come out every day, though most of them 
die away without infecting many computers due to human countermeasures including 
using antivirus software, patching susceptible computers, disconnecting network 
services and so on. Thus, any proposed defense mechanism must be evaluated in 
handling many active worms simultaneously. Wang et al [12] investigated the 
immunization defense on different network topologies including hierarchical and 
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clustered. Immunization can be thought of as effective packet filtering. Immunization 
from one worm does not guarantee protection against other forms of the worm.  Wang 
et al [12] considers permanent or static immunization where a node once immunized is 
permanently protected. In reality, immunization must be taken as temporary due to 
multiple worm outbreaks since a computer being recovered from a certain worm can be 
reinfected by other worms immediately. In other words, any computer could not be 
permanently immune to many Internet worms.  
 
3.1.2 Characteristics of Worm Spreading 
In order to defend against future worms, we need to understand the network 
characteristics of worm spreading. Clearly the following characteristics of worm must 
be well understood before the model of Internet worm propagation could be developed.  
1. The rate and pattern of infection,  
2. The effect of factors on underlying network topology, and  
3. The human countermeasures in the network   
If such characteristics were known, mechanisms might be developed to detect an on-
going, network wide infection. Certain nodes of the Internet are well protected 
compared with the others.  Moreover, at certain vital installations the rates at which 
infections are cured are higher compared with others.  To model this real world 
phenomenon we have taken into account in our simulations variable infection rates and 
variable cure rates.  
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Also in this chapter, with real Internet topology data, we find that there are two 
effective factors that influence worm propagation: temporary immunization time and 
network delays. We note that our simulation results can explain how fast a virulent 
worm can spread and suggest effective mechanisms to monitor and defend against the 
propagation of worms. It also shows that we can find location(s) in the network that 
when quarantined would slow down the rage of spread.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the analytical 
methodologies of Internet worms. In Section 3.3, we give a brief review of the classical 
epidemic models and point out their limitations to model Internet worm propagation. In 
Section 3.4 and 3.5, we show the simulation results based on different network 
topologies. We conclude the chapter with an outline of our future work in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Analytical Methodologies of Internet Worms 
Classical Epidemic model 
In epidemiology research, there exist several deterministic and stochastic models for 
virus spreading. About ten years ago, Kephart and White [5] presented the 
Epidemiological model to understand and control the prevalence of viruses. This model 
is based on biological epidemiology and uses nonlinear differential equations to 
provide a qualitative understanding of virus spreading. They assumed that classical 
epidemic models are all homogeneous, which means that an infected host is equally 
likely to infect any of other susceptible hosts. Though at that time the model 
assumptions were considerably accurate because they considered that infection takes 
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place when hosts share their disks, but with the spreading on the Internet such 
assumptions are no longer valid. They also introduced an analytical model called SIS 
model in which infected hosts become susceptible once being cured of the infection.  
 
Two-factor Worm Model 
 
The Code Red worm incident of July 2001 has been investigated to model and analyze 
Internet worm propagation. Zou et al [11] introduced that there were two factors 
affecting Code Red propagation: one is the effect of human countermeasures against 
worm propagation; the other is the slower worm infection rate due to Internet 
congestion caused by Code Red worm. Based on the classical epidemic models, they 
derive a new general Internet worm model called two-factor worm model, which 
matches the observed Code Red worm data of July 19th 2001 with their simulation 
results and numerical solutions.  
 
Active Worm Model 
Chen et al [13] present a model, referred to as the Analytical Active Worm Propagation 
(AAWP) model that characterizes the propagation of worms that employ random 
scanning. They compare their mathematical model with the Epidemiological model and 
Weaver’s [14] simulation results which use hit list scanning. The AAWP model shows 
that the model can be applied to monitoring, detecting and defending against the spread 
of active worms. The AAWP model can be also extended to Local AAWP model to 
understand the characteristics of the spread of worms that employ local subnet 
scanning effectively.  
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Applying Infection Delay in Worm Epidemic  
Wang et al [12] introduced an analytic model to capture the impact of underlying 
topology in computer viral propagation. The simulations are conducted to attempt to 
answer the question – how a virus propagates in real network. They assume that an 
infection rate for each edge and a cure rate for each infected node are constant. In 
addition to the spread of a virus in real network, Wang and Wang [20] investigated the 
model extending the classical epidemic model by including two specific parameters: 
infection delay and user vigilance time.  The infection delay is a period of time 
between the arrival of a virus on certain node and further infection from that node. The 
user vigilance time is the immune time. The model of capturing the effective of 
infection delay and user vigilance was validated by simulation analysis based on the 
homogeneous SIS epidemic model. In real networks however, the worm infection rate 
and cure rate are not likely to be a constant. 
We also examined several major characteristics of infection, including the variant 
rate and pattern of infection through the different network topologies and the rate of re-
infection at each host during an attack. We use a discrete time model and deterministic 
approximation to describe the spread of Internet worms. 
 
3.3 Worm Propagation Models 
The epidemic propagation models for the study of biological infectious diseases have 
been applied on modeling the propagation of computer viruses [5, 8]. The propagation 
of a real worm on the Internet is a complicated discrete event process. In this section 
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we consider only continuous process and use the continuous differential equations to 
describe it, which means that a worm on an infectious host continuously tries to find 
and infect other susceptible hosts. We introduce two classical deterministic epidemic 
models and an extension of one of models, which are the basis of our experimental 
design. We also point out their limitations when we try to use them to model Internet 
worm propagation.   
 
3.3.1 Definition 
In classical epidemic model, it is defined that a host is called an infectious host at time t 
if it has been infected by virus before t. A host that is vulnerable to virus is called a 
susceptible host. By infection and cure rate, we mean the probability with which an 
infectious host send infective messages to its neighbors and the probability with which 
an infectious host will be cured of the infection once it received infective messages 
from its neighbors, respectively. In addition we define that the temporary immunity is a 
temporary hold on a worm spreading, which means that many hosts will be susceptible 
or infected by new worm outbreaks at time t though they are already immune to old 
worm that came out before time t. 
 
3.3.2 Classical simple epidemic model 
In classical simple epidemic model, each host stays in one of two states: susceptible or 
infectious. Each susceptible host becomes an infectious one at a certain rate. At the 














Size of total vulnerable population 
Number of susceptible hosts at time t 
Number of infectious hosts at time t 
Number of removed infectious hosts at time t 
Infection rate 
Curing rate on an infectious host 
Removal rate on an infectious host 












   Table 3.1 Notations of Worm Epidemic Models 
 
This model system where having the infection and being cured does not confer 
immunity. This model is called the SIS model, because hosts move between the S 
(Susceptible) and I (Infectious states). Using the terms defined in table 3.1, the differential 
equation for the SIS model is 
 
dt
tdI )(  = βI(t)[N – I(t)] - δI(t)        (3.1) 
 
where I (t) is the number of infectious hosts at time t; N is the size of population; β is 
the infection rate; and δ is the cure rate.  
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We assume that at beginning, t =0, one host is infectious and the other (N −1) hosts are 
all susceptible. Let S(t) = N − I (t) denote the number of susceptible hosts at time t. 
Replace I(t) in equation (3.1) by N − S(t) and we get 
 
dt
tdS )(  = -βS(t)[N – S(t)] + δ[N – S(t)]     (3.2) 
 




 = βSI - δI       (3.3) 
        
dt
dS  = -βSI + δI  
 













=      (3.4) 
 
We conclude that, as t → ∞, 
 
    I∞ = N - ρ        (3.5) 
where ρ = β
δ
 and I0 is the initial number of infectious hosts. Therefore, not absolutely 
all the population gets infected. This shows that each infectious host infects others with an 
average value of β per unit time.  
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         Figure 3.1: Classical simple epidemic (SIS) model 
 
However, the probability that a host becomes infected is not the same for every host 
because it is a function of their connectivity and the infection characteristics with a 
certain cure rate. We note that the probabilities per unit time of infection and of cure 
are independent. Once a host is cured, it is immediately capable of being re-infected. 
Figure 3.1 compares the number of infectious hosts as a function of time as obtained 
from equation (3.4). The graph contains 100,000 hosts and the infection and cure rates 
are β = 1.0 and δ = 0.2, respectively. It shows that the number of infectious hosts is 
nearly exponentially increased from t = 0 to t = 20. 
The number of infections stops increasing when about 80% of all susceptible hosts 
have been infected. The SIS model does not take into account the possibility of host’s 
removal due to death or immunization which would lead to the so-called Susceptible-
Infectious-Removed (SIR) model [9]. It also does not model secondary effects such as 
reduced infection rate due to network congestion when many hosts are infected [11]. 
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3.3.3 Kermack-Mckendrick model 
In epidemiology modeling, Kermack-Mckendrick model considers the removal process 
of infectious hosts [9]. This model is called the classical SIR epidemic model. 
Kermack-Mckendrick model can be described as shown in figure 3.2. Each host is 
assumed to be in one of three states: Susceptible (S) meaning vulnerable to the virus, 
Infectious (I) meaning infected and actively infecting other hosts, and Removed (R), 









Figure 3.2: The SIR model in which hosts move between three states: Susceptible (S), 
Infectious (I) and Removed (R) with infection rate β and removal rate λ. 
 
In this model, the assumptions are that susceptible hosts become infected by contact 
with infectious hosts, infectious hosts either die or recover at a constant rate, and the 
total population is constant. The sizes of the susceptible and infectious populations 





     
dt
tdI )(
 = βS(t)I(t) - λI(t) 
    
dt
tdS )(
 = -βS(t)I(t)     (3.6) 
    
dt
tdR )(
 = λI(t)   
 
where β is the infection rate; λ is the rate of removal. 
 
The Kermack-Mckendrick model improves the SIS epidemic model by considering 
that some infectious hosts are immune, are placed in isolation, or have died. However, 
this model is still not suitable for capturing the effect of multiple worm propagation 
simultaneously. First, in the Internet, many new viruses and worms come out every day 
though most of them disappear due to human countermeasures including using 
antivirus software, patching susceptible computers, disconnecting network service 
from the infectious hosts and so on. In other words, many hosts will be susceptible or 
infected by new virus outbreaks at time t though they are already immune to recovered 
old virus that came out before time t. But in Kermack-Mckendrick model once 
infectious hosts recover, they will not be infected again by any virus and stays in the 
“removed” or “immunized” state forever. The link delays required for the infection to 
travel to the hosts are captured in the aggregate value called infection rate. While such 
gross estimates are correct for long lasting worms, it does capture neither the short 
lived ones nor the vulnerability of nodes which are reachable quickly. In this chapter, 
we consider that the propagations of most Internet worms are topology dependent and 
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need to be modeled by considering the properties of the underlining topology, which 
will be discussed in a later section. 
 
3.3.4 An extension for the SIR model 
We assume that a more general case, allowing for loss of immunity that causes 
recovered hosts to become susceptible again. In other words, a portion of the removed 
hosts a time t, R(t), due to loss of immunization join the susceptible population at time t 
+ τ, S(t+τ). Therefore a portion of population dynamically changes from susceptible to 
infectious, to removed and back to susceptible. Model that describes such an 
epidemical cycle is referred to as SIRS model. If hosts in the R state are only 











Figure 3.3: The SIRS model; with conferring a temporary immunity, it can move from 
the R state to the S state 
 
Our model is a generalization presented in [10], allowing hosts recovering from the 
infective to go into a temporarily immune state rather than directly back into the 
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susceptible state. Let µ be the rate at which removals loose the immunization and 
becomes susceptible. Using the same notation as the SIR model we obtain the 













µλ −=  
 
Also, we have S(t) + I(t) + R(t) = N, ∀t ≥ 0. We can supply the same initial conditions 
as with the SIR model and numerically solve the SIRS model. Let ρ = λ/β be the 
epidemic threshold if re-susceptible rate, µ, is less than removal rate, λ, and I0 and S0 
are the initial fraction of infectious hosts and of susceptible hosts, respectively. For the 
epidemic to occur, we must have: 
 
0| =tdtdI > 0 → βS0I0 - λI0 > 0 → S0 > βλ      (3.8) 
Clearly S0 must satisfy this condition for the epidemic to occur. The equation (3.8) 
indicates that no epidemic occurs if the initial number of susceptible hosts is smaller 
than the epidemic threshold, S0 < ρ. This important result of the threshold effect is the 
same as what was already discovered by Kermack and McKendrick [9]; the population 




















Figure 3.4: SIRS epidemic model; it shows the number of infectious, susceptible, and 
removed hosts as a function of time 
 
Figure 3.4 compares the number of infectious, susceptible, and removed hosts as a 
function of time as obtained from equation (3.7). We attempt to solve this model using 
the numerical capabilities of MAPLE (mathematics software) without finding an 
explicit function-formula for the number of susceptible, infectious and removed hosts. 
The graph contains 100,000 hosts and the infection, removal and re-susceptible rates 
are β = 1.0 and λ = 0.2, µ = 0.07 respectively. It shows that the number of infectious 
hosts is initially exponentially increased up to about 80% of total population and then 
decreasing the growth of infection population. It is also observed that the infection 
growth will reach a stable equilibrium after an amount of time passes. 
While there is a vast literature covering models in which the “temporary immunity” 
step is not considered (i.e., SIS models and SIR models), comparatively little work has 
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been done to understand how the nature of the R → S transition affects the dynamics of 
an epidemic of Internet worms. With regard to the loss of immunity we consider two 
different types of worm behaviors, depending on parameters: (i) periodic epidemic 
outbreaks and (ii) one or more extended outbreaks followed by extinction of the 
epidemic due to stopping spreading of old worms. 
We note that instead of acquiring infinite immunity to a specific epidemic, infected 
hosts in this extended model spend a constant number of time steps in a generalized 
immune state before returned to the susceptible population. We have to investigate the 
SIRS model with immunity lasting non-constant time step since hosts can be 
significantly delayed in the removed state by mechanisms such as a large constant 
period of temporary immunity. 
 
3.4 Simulation and Analysis 
In this section we describe our experimental design and validate the simple epidemic 
(SIS) model of computer virus introduced by Kephart [5] using the results of our 
simulation. We also present measurements of worm infections in two different network 
topologies with random rates at which an infectious node attempts to infect its 
neighboring nodes and random rates at which it protects itself or remove viruses itself. 
These experiments provide insight into the characteristics of infection propagation on 
computer networks and they also serve as the basis for future research work on 




3.4.1 Random transit stub model without topology constraint 
Our experiments have been conducted using a simulation environment that is capable 
of simulating hundreds of thousands of computing nodes with random network 
topology and any viral epidemic model. The network topology that is used in this 
simulation is constructed by Transit Stub model that produces hierarchical graphs in a 
different way by consisting of interconnected transit and stub domains [17]. A 
connected random graph is first constructed; each node in that graph represents a 
transit domain. Each node is then replaced by another connected random graph, which 
represents the backbone network topology of one transit domain. Next, for each node 
in each transit domain, a number of connected random graphs that represent the stub 
domains linked to that node are generated. Finally, certain number of additional edges 
is created between pairs of nodes, one from a transit domain and one from a stub 
domain, or one from each of two different stub domains. Clearly, if the random graphs 
generated are all connected, an entirely connected graph is constructed by the above 
procedure. Figure 3.5 shows the example of Transit-Stub model. 
As shown in figure 3.5, transit domain represents the backbone of the Internet and 
each backbone node in a transit domain connects to a number of stub domains through 
nodes, called gateway, in the stub domain. In this experiment we do not consider the 
topology constraint such as infection delay time when infective messages are able to 
reach a susceptible node. Instead, the infection process was simulated by varying the 














Figure 3.5: Example of Transit-Stub Model 
 
3.4.2 System models 
We consider a network with 100,000 nodes and two simulation scenarios. The first one 
is cured and infection case (CI strategy), the same as the one used in the classical 
simple SIS model, in which an infectious node determines whether it can be cured of 
infection or not before infecting any of susceptible nodes connected to it. The second 
one is infection and cured case (IC strategy) where an infectious node determines 
whether it can be cured or not after infecting any of susceptible neighboring nodes. We 
also analyzed the worm epidemic model with two different infection and cure rates: 
one is constant infection/cure rate at which an infectious node is equally likely to infect 
any of other susceptible nodes and to be cured of infection. The other one is variant 
infection/cure rate at which certain infectious nodes are likely to infect more 
susceptible nodes than other infectious nodes do. In addition, the infection rate, β, is 
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associated with each of edges. Similarly, the rate of cure of infection, δ, is related to 
each node. 
A few assumptions and simplifications were made to ensure feasibility of our 
experiment. First, a single initially infected node is randomly selected to release worm 
in each trial and we performed 500 simulation runs using same parameters. Second, a 
desired random graph has average degree of 5 on each node. It means that the average 
number of infectious messages that an infected node can generate is five. In other 
words, an infected node selects on the average five neighboring nodes to infect. Finally, 
to simulate the model, time is divided into a number of discrete steps, and on each step 
the population of hosts in each state is altered according to the different rules such as 
different rate of infection and recovery, which means that hosts move between the S 
(Susceptible states) and I (Infectious states) at a certain rate. In addition, relevant data 
is recorded per unit time and simulation stops when some desired state is reached, such 
as all nodes are infected or the completion of simulation time. 
 
3.4.3 Initial results 
Figure 3.6 shows the total number of infectious nodes averaged across the 500 runs of 
the two different types of simulation models. Note that in the case of constant rate the 
number of infectious nodes quickly reaches almost 80% of the total population, and the 
infection growth slows down after that point. This implies that after almost 50 units of 

























































































a) With constant Infection/Cure rat 3.6: Comparison of the average number of infected nodes as a function of time 
 different epidemic strategies; N = 100,000, (a) with constant rates, β = 1.0, and 
2 (b) with non-constant rates  
ition, in the case of variant infection rate the number of infectious nodes infects 
susceptible nodes with different infection rate at each time. 
esult is consistent with the results in simulation presented by Kephart [5]. Also a 
erable fraction of the nodes in a transit stub network remains uninfected for long 
s of time due to their connectivity. Comparing the two different epidemic 
ies between constant infection/cure rate and non-constant infection/cure rate, we 
hat there is a slight difference between these two strategies as shown in figure 3.6. 
ample, for IC strategy, it takes almost 50 time units for the infection growth to 
own in the model with constant rate in figure 3.6 (a) while it takes 40 time units 
 model with variant rate in figure 3.6 (b). For CI strategy, it takes 70 time units to 



































































      
b) IC strategy with three different µ valuesa) CI strategy with three different µ values 
 
Figure 3.7: Comparison of the number of infectious nodes as a function of time in two 
different epidemic strategies. All cases are for 100,000 nodes, an average infection rate 
β of 1.0, a removed rate λ is 0.2, and a re-susceptible rate µ of 0.07 
 
Clearly, it shows that CI strategy has more number of infected nodes than IC strategy 
does in both the types of simulation models. 
Figure 3.7 shows the total number of infectious nodes averaged across the 500 runs 
of the two different types of simulation models. Note that in both cases the number of 
infectious nodes increases almost exponentially from time t = 0 to t = 10, and then the 
rate of infection growth decreases. This result is consistent with the numerical solution 
obtained from SIRS mode while there is little difference in comparison of two 
simulation models. It is also observed that the number of infectious nodes increases as 
the re-susceptible rate increases in a stable equilibrium stage. It is intuitive that we can 
expect a lower rate of infectious propagation when the rate of R→S transition is lower, 







































































a) CI Strategy with various temporary immunization times 
 
Figure 3.8: Extinction between two differen
temporary immunization time θ. All paramet
same as those given in Figure 3.7 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the average number of infect
simulation models (CI and IC strategies) with
As defined in section 3.3.4, we account for th
time period to protect the same infectious m
worm comes out during a worm infection. In 
been immune to a worm it will not be again i
might be susceptible to or infected by new
immunization. We note that the difference of
referred to as the temporary immunization tim
cured of infection and takes 10 unit temporary 
susceptible or re-infected by other worms at tim
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b) IC Strategy with various temporary immunization timest epidemic models with variation of 
ers assigned in this experiment are the 
ious nodes as a function of time for two 
 various temporary immunization times. 
e temporary immunization time as the 
essages from infected nodes until new 
other words, once an infected node has 
nfected by the same worm. However, it 
 worm outbreak which arrives after 
 time between two worm outbreaks is 
e. For instance, if an infectious node is 
immunization times at time t, it could be 
e t + 10.  


































Figure 3.9: Comparison between the total times to infect 80% of total population vs. 
the starting node in a worm spreading; N = 10,000, infection rate β = 1.0, and cure rate 
δ = 0.2 
 
In addition, compared with the two simulation models, there is significantly less 
variation in the average number of infectious nodes during infection. Results of these 
experiments show that for a given epidemic model the longer temporary immunization 
time, the wider will be the variation in infection growth. It is also observed that the 
infection growth of any type of propagation will reach to a stable equilibrium after an 
amount of time passes.  
In figure 3.9 assuming a particular chosen node as the first infected node, the graph 
shows the total amount of time to infect at least 80% of the entire population. The 
fastest time to infect 80% of the population was 7 time units and the longest time was 
18. The results of figure 3.9 points out that for a given topology and a given infection 
model, nodes that are in certain critical locations spreads the worms much faster than 
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the others. This clearly points to the fact the aggregate infection rate using in many 
previous works are insufficient for a concrete analysis. 
 
3.5 Worm Propagation with Topology Constraint 
We extend our simulation methodology to include a realistic network model and 
evaluate the impact of topological constraints. After infecting a susceptible node, a 
worm attempts to infect other susceptible nodes with infection delay time which is the 
time to find its target nodes; it may attempt to only infect a small number of other 
susceptible nodes corresponding to network topological criteria, such as connectivity of 
network. 
In addition, we focus on the behavior of Internet worm propagation in response to 
multiple worm outbreaks. We model the impact of multiple active worms by specifying 
the temporary immunization time under which an infected node could be immune to 
the same type of worm after being cured. If many worms are active though they could 
be removed without infection then the temporary immunization time will be a small, 
which means that any node in “removed” state as described in our terminology could 
be susceptible or infectious by new worm outbreaks at time t + θ  although being 
already cured or recovered at time t. We recall that the time θ is the temporary 
immunization time which is a measure of how many measurement intervals it will take 
before the new worm comes out in the Internet. On the other hand, the time θ is long 
enough for an infected node to be immune to the worm unless new worm conquers the 
entire network at its high rate of growth.  
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3.5.1 Network model 
In this section, we describe the experimental network model of Internet worm infection 
using real Internet data set (round trip time (RTT) data) called topology constraint. As 
the Internet has grown, it is difficult to accurately model the topology and structure of 
hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks. As a result, it is infeasible to model 
the full Internet topology for our experiments, so we, instead, look for developing a 
smaller topology without loss of network characteristics. Our model of the network 
topology defines the latency (RTT) data for infection delay time and the paths that a 
worm can follow when propagating. We note that this does not necessarily mean either 
a fully-interconnected topology or an infection path along every network link. Our 
interest lies in the network model used to obtain real-time information about the 
Internet topology measurements around the Internet.  
In this study, we obtain network topology data (e.g. RTT data and traceroute) from 
the NLANR Active Measurement Program (AMP) [21]. AMP provides measurements 
of forward IP path and graphical analysis for Internet usage on undertaking site to site 
measurement across the HPC networks, which has currently more than 140 active 
measurement monitors deployed to measure currently round trip times, topology and 
loss. Given the current network topology, this work is designed to compliment the 
measurements taken by Abilene network [22] that is an advanced backbone network 
that connects regional network aggregation points as shown in figure 3.10. It supports 
the topology measurement services to universities participating in Internet2 and also 

















































































Figure 3.10: The Abilene Network Topology including Abilene core nodes, connectors 
and some of participants [22] 
 
Our network model consists entirely of 130 active measurement nodes provided by 
AMP. Each node is connected to the global network shown in Abilene network 
topology. The global network represents the Abilene core nodes which are connected 
together and can address and forward packets to each other directly. It is likely that 
some core nodes contain multiple measurement nodes that frequently communicate 
among themselves. 
For our experiment, we make a simulation across 500 runs of two different types of 
simulation model (CI and IC strategies) as described in previous section. In addition to 
these two types of strategies, we also analyzed two different rules of infection rate: 
constant infection/cure rate and non-constant dynamic infection/cure rate. Finally, we 
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note that the round trip time is too fast to capture the rate of population of infected 
hosts though large RTTs have values greater than 400ms and occasionally as great as 
500ms in our observed data. We therefore consider that a valuable mechanism for 
converting a continuous system time such as RTT into a discrete simulation time, 
which means that the system time is divided into a number of discrete steps (or time 
unit), and on each step the population of hosts can be observed according to two states 
at a certain rate: S (Susceptible states) and I (Infectious states) respectively. 
 
3.5.2 Simulation Results 
We simulate a simple, relatively small Internet network model consisting of 130 active 
monitors connected to each other and located around United States as presented in 
Abilene network. We examined the performance of the worm epidemic model with 
topology constraint using the classical epidemic model. For our simulation, we set the 
discrete interval time into one millisecond (ms), the maximum simulation time for trial 
to 125 ms corresponding to the maximum RTT value observed from AMP. For Internet 
worm epidemic model we assume that the infection rate β and the cure rate δ are the 
same as what are applied in the classical epidemic model. 
The total average number of infected hosts over time for two different types of 
infection/cure rate is shown in figure 3.11. In each case of model we analyze the 
effectiveness of two different simulation strategies (CI and IC strategies) described in 
section 3.4.2. Considering the results of figure 3.11 we see that the infection growth 








































































            b) With Non-constant Infection/Cure rate a) With Constant Infection/Cure rate 
 
Figure 3.11: Comparison of average number of infectious nodes as a function of time 
in two different simulation models 
 
of total population in CI strategy while 60 or 70 nodes in the IC strategy.  
Moreover, it takes longer for the rate of growth of worm propagation to be in 
equilibrium. On the other hand, in classical epidemic model the growth of the curve 
become quickly stable as shown in figure 3.6. The result of these experiments is 
undisputed because the growth of infection propagation would be slower if the 
epidemic model includes topology constraint referred to as infection delay time. 
Comparing the two different epidemic strategies between constant infection/cure rate 
and non-constant infection/cure rate, we note that in both case more rapid propagation 
of worm infection were observed in the CI strategy. 
Figure 3.12 shows the result for the comparison of the total 60% infection times as 
the starting node in Internet worm propagation, obtained from 500 runs of the 
simulation for Abilene network topology model. We note that some variation exists in 










































































































































































































Figure 3.12: Comparison between the total times to infect 60% of total participants vs. 
the starting node in a worm spreading with constant infection and cure rates 
 
The fastest total time to infect 60% of total participant hosts is 61ms when Indiana 
University is infected first and the longest was 125ms when University of Alaska was 
infected first. As shown in Figure 3.10, Indiana University is considered as the center 
of Abilene backbone network as well as one of Abilene connectors connecting directly 
to the Abilene network while University of Alaska is just participant located away from 
the central point of the Abilene network. 
We also measured the total number of re-infections that each participant host 
experienced during a worm infection in order to validate whether the structure of 
network topology has great influence on infection propagation. Figure 3.13 shows the 
result for the number of re-infections for each of the 130 participant belonging to 



















































































































































































          Figure 3.13: Counting the total number of re-infections at each participant host 
 
For example, Indiana University is attacked 86 times on average, while Wisconsin 
university is attacked 41 times only. It may be pointed out that for a given topology we 
might slow down the growth of Internet worm infection if we find critical locations 
where some nodes are more prone to being attacked more than others. Moore et al [18] 
investigated the containment system using address blacklisting and content filtering to 
minimize worm propagation in the Internet.  The simulation system we have performed 
could identify addresses to be blacklisted. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have presented measurements of worm infections in two different 
network topologies with constant or non-constant infection and cure rates. We 
extended our simulation methodology to include a real Internet network model and 
evaluated the impact of topology constraints. As a first step, in this chapter we have 
described the two classical simple epidemic models and pointed out their limitations. In 
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addition to those models, we presented an extended model, allowing for loss of 
immunity that causes recovered hosts to become susceptible again. Our simulation has 
been conducted using two simulation processes including Infection and Cure per time 
unit during the spreading of a worm infection. We considered the IC and CI strategies 
for worm infections and showed that the CI strategy causes more rapid propagation. 
Furthermore, as part of our ongoing work we are working on accurate analytical 
models to capture the spread of worms on the Internet.  We are also working on the 

































Chapter 4  




The task of detection and prevention of worms has become more difficult on our 
existing computing infrastructure. Previous works on worm modeling have been 
investigated to model and analyze Internet worm propagation [11, 12, 13] and have 
introduced an analytic model to capture the impact of underlying topology in computer 
viral propagation [19, 64]. However the control of infectious worm has been one of the 
most important issues of computer networks. In this chapter, we attempt to investigate 
a new approach to such optimal control problems with two costs to be minimized.   
There is now a large body of work on the cost-benefit analysis of infectious disease 
control in the public health literature. Goldman and Lightwood [55] presented the cost 
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optimization problem of minimizing the value of costs incurred from both disease and 
treatment in biological epidemiological model (SIS). This model uses nonlinear 
differential equations to provide a qualitative understanding of virus spreading. 
However, we do not try to find an optimal closed form solution for an economic cost. 
Instead, we start with the optimal control problem for the cost, say network delay, as 
derived by Pontryagin’s maximum principle [56, 57].  
Optimal control can be regarded as one of the possible methodologies of the control 
system’s design. Its role in general theory is unquestionable, but direct practical 
applications for Internet worm have so far been scarce. Optimal control is well 
established in some areas, like trajectory planning in the aerospace field and robotics, 
or model predictive control in chemical industry and furthermore, increasingly many 
new industrial applications of optimal control have been introduced. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents some of 
important issues in computer networks. Section 4.3 compares our work with several 
related works. Section 4.4 gives a brief review of the classical epidemic models and a 
modification of SIS model with treatment to control Internet worm propagation. The 
analysis of optimization problems is given in Section 4.5. Our numerical solution of 
optimal controls is also introduced in this section. Section 4.6 shows the simulation 
results based on a network topology. We conclude the chapter with an outline of our 





4.2 Statement of Problems 
Infection Cost vs. Treatment Cost 
This chapter considers the optimal control problem of minimizing the value of two 
costs: first is the infection cost which can be interpreted as the node delay due to 
infection caused by reduced system performance, and increased network delay due to 
congestion in the network, and the second is treatment cost also referred to as node 
delay incurred by a certain level of filtering. In other words, both the infection cost and 
treatment cost are referred to as variations of the nodal processing delay. Our optimal 
control approach is proposed which enables tradeoffs between the infection cost of 
compromised systems and the treatment cost of defensive countermeasures, with 
respect to time.  
 
How many nodes needed to filter? 
We have presented a notion of optimal number of nodes to obtain filtering treatment at 
certain infection rate, providing both a mathematical model of the control factors 
affecting how many nodes to filter, and collecting empirical data to compare the 
numerical solution of our analytical model with the results of our simulation. For worm 
propagation model, we apply the classical SIS model [5, 8]. With this model, the 
assumptions are that during each period the infected nodes can deal with treatment that 
will increase their rate of recovery and it has no preventive properties upon recovery. 
The treatment will also be assumed to exist in discrete time.  
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When to start a filtering treatment? 
“When to start filtering?'' presents a serious problem to the security administrator 
because there are unnecessary treatment cost incurred by forcing the administrator to start 
filtering as soon as possible and also to delay a filtering treatment so that it takes a 
more time to fix a security problem. We note that our simulation results can explain 
when to start the filtering treatment to prevent virulent worms from spreading and 
suggest effective mechanisms to monitor and defend against the propagation of worms. 
It should also be noted that we are not considering the issue of where to serve a 
filtering treatment within computer networks. Our model considered only the question 
of how many nodes to filter and when to obtain filtering services to minimize the 
infection cost and reduce the spread of worm infection.  
 
4.3 Comparison with Previous Work 
In epidemiology research, there exist several deterministic and stochastic models for 
virus spreading. About ten years ago, Kephart and White [5, 6] presented the Epi-
demiological model (SIS) to understand and control the prevalence of viruses. This 
model is based on biological epidemiology and uses nonlinear differential equations to 
provide a qualitative understanding of virus spreading. They assumed that classical 
epidemic models are all homogeneous, which means that an infected host is equally 
likely to infect any of other susceptible hosts. Though at that time the model 
assumptions were considerably accurate because they considered that infection takes 
place when hosts share their disks, but such assumptions are no longer valid with the 
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spreading on the Internet.  
The Code Red worm incident of July 2001 has been investigated to model and 
analyze Internet worm propagation [4]. Based on the classical epidemic models, Zou et 
al [58] presented mathematical analysis of three worm propagation models under this 
dynamic quarantine method. The analysis shows that the dynamic quarantine can 
reduce the speed of worm propagation, which can give us precious time to fight against 
a worm.  
In the spread of a virus on a real network, Wang and Wang [20] investigated the 
model extending the classical epidemic model by including two specific parameters: 
infection delay and user vigilance time. The infection delay is a period of time between 
the arrival of a virus on certain node and further infection from that node. The user 
vigilance time is the immune time. The simulation study suggests that the most cost 
effective strategy will need to employ a combination of infection delay and user 
vigilance. 
Kreidl et al [59] presented a feedback control autonomic defense system to 
improve survivability for a single host computer. The survivability objective is 
expressed as the minimization of a certain mathematical cost that quantifies a tradeoff 
between the failure cost of a compromised information system and the maintenance 
cost of ongoing defensive countermeasures. However, their system is mainly about 
how to detect a worm’s process that is already running on a computer and then recover 




Beattie et al [60] presented a notion of an optimal time to apply security updates, 
providing both mathematical models of the factors affecting when to patch, and 
collecting empirical data to give the model practical value. Huerta and Tsimring [61] 
analyzed the role of contact tracing as a part of the epidemics control strategy in 
complex networks. The simulation demonstrated that by applying this strategy, a major 
outbreak can be significantly reduced or even eliminated at a small additional cost. 
Kim et al [64] introduced the extension of SIR model to simulate worm 
propagation in two different network topologies. Whereas in the SIR model once a 
node is cured after infection it becomes permanently immune, this model allows the 
immunity to be temporary, since the cured nodes may again become infected, maybe 
with a different strain of the same worm. The simulation study also showed that time to 
infect a large portion of the network varied significantly depending on where the 
infection begins. They extended the simulation methodology to include a real Internet 
network model and evaluated the impact of topology constraints. 
In this chapter we examined several major characteristics of infection, including 
the variant rate and pattern of infection through the network topology and the rate of 
treatment at a router during a worm attack. We use a discrete time model and 
deterministic approximation to describe the spread of Internet worms. 
 
4.4 The SIS Infection Model 
We introduce two classical deterministic epidemic models which are the basis of our 
experimental design. In classical epidemic model, it is defined that a node is called an 
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infectious node at time t if it has been infected by virus before t. A node that is 
vulnerable to virus is called a susceptible node. 
 
4.4.1 Infection without Treatment 
In particular, the most common mechanism of infection is through contact with an 
infected node, and the mechanism of recovery is either deterministic or purely 
stochastic with a certain typical time of recovery. In the classical susceptible-
infectious-susceptible (SIS) model [5, 8], a recovered node immediately becomes 
susceptible again, while in a more complicated susceptible-infectious-removed SIR 
model [9], cured nodes become immune and effectively excluded from further 
dynamics. In SIS model, each node stays in one of two states: susceptible or infectious. 
Each susceptible node becomes an infectious one at a certain rate. At the same time, 
infectious nodes are cured and become again susceptible at a different rate. In this 
model, having the infection and being cured, does not confer immunity. Infectious 
nodes have a constant probability of recovery in each period with treatment. There is 
no permanent immunity to the infection, so a cured node becomes susceptible again 
upon recovery.  Using the terms defined in table 4.1, the differential equation for the 
SIS model without treatment is 
 
dt
















Size of total vulnerable population 
Number of susceptible nodes at time t 
Number of infectious nodes at time t 
Number of treated infectious nodes at time t 
Infection rate 
Curing rate on an infectious node 
Treatment rate on an infectious node 
Infection cost 
A function of treatment cost 
Adjoint variable 
Epidemic threshold 
     
Table 4.1 Notations of SIS Infection Model 
 
We assume that at beginning, t =0, one host is infectious and the other (N −1) nodes 
are all susceptible. Let S(t) = N − I (t) denote the number of susceptible nodes at time t. 
Replace I(t) in equation (4.1) by N − S(t) and we get 
 
dt
tdS )(  = -βS(t)[N – S(t)] + δ[N – S(t)]  (4.2) 
 














=        (4.3) 
 
We conclude that, as t → ∞, 
 
I∞ = N - ε        (4.4) 
 
where ε = δ/β and I0 is the initial number of infectious nodes. Therefore, not absolutely 
all the population gets infected. This shows that each infectious node infects others 
with an average value of β per unit time. However, the probability that a node becomes 
infected is not the same for every node because; it is a function of their connectivity 
and the infection characteristics with a certain cure rate. We note that the probabilities 
per unit time of infection and of cure are independent. Once a node is cured, it is 
immediately capable of being re-infected. 
 
4.4.2 Infection with Treatment 
We now present the optimization model that takes into account infection and treatment 
costs. Assume that filtering treatment is available. Infectious nodes can use a level of 
filtering during each period which will increase the probability of recovery. Higher the 
level of filtering more will be number of packets processed for infection and hence 








tdI λδβ −−−=    (4.5) 
 
where λ > δ > 0, and I(t) ≥ Q(t) ≥ 0 
Let U(t) denote the number of untreated infectious nodes at time t. Then equation (4.5) 




tdI λδβ −−=    (4.6) 
 
Where U(t) = I(t) – Q(t) 
If Q(t) = I(t) in each period, then every node which is infected obtains treatment for 




tdI λβ −=     (4.7) 
 
Note that if the treatment is very effective, then it may be the case that I = Q, and the 
infection no longer is epidemic with full treatment, which is called the equilibrium 
state. The equilibrium of the model with full treatment is the same as that of the model 





Assume that the worm infection brings about an infection cost, CI, which can be 
interpreted as the node delay due to infection caused by reduced system performance. 
In other words, if hosts get infected, too many ‘bad’ (infectious) packets would be sent 
from the infected hosts. Therefore, unnecessary network delay may be incurred from 
network congestion and buffer overflow. We note that a router does not get infected 
while every individual host can get infected by computer virus and worm.  
The node delay is referred to as router delay since many bad packets causes 
increased network delay at a router. Once hosts become cured of worm infection a 
router is also cured. For example, from figure 4.1, if every host in subnet A is cured of 
infection, a router A becomes cured. However, if one of hosts in subnet A remains 




Subnet B Subnet A 
 
Figure 4.1: Two subnets connected by routers 
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In this point of view, we apply the classical simple SIS model in which each router 
stays in one of two states: susceptible or infectious. Each susceptible router becomes an 
infectious one by receiving infectious packets from infected hosts. At the same time, 
infectious routers are cured and become again susceptible if no infectious packet 




The treatment cost, C(Q), is a function of the total number of infectious nodes treated 
per period. It can be also referred to as node delay incurred by filtering packets at a 
router. Similarly, we consider the node delay as the router delay since the router suffers 
from processing delay due to a certain level of packet filtering mechanism. With the 
SIS model, the assumptions are that filtering treatment is available and during each 
period the infected routers can deal with treatment that will increase their rate of 
recovery and protect their subnet hosts. However, it has no preventive properties upon 
recovery. The treatment will also be assumed to exist in discrete time.  
Once every subnet host becomes cured of infection, filtering treatment will be 
stopped at that router. In other words, infectious routers have a constant probability of 
recovery in each period with treatment. There is no permanent immunity to the 
infection, so a cured router becomes susceptible again upon recovery. It has been 
determined that the treatment can reduce the level of infection and prevent the 
prospects of the spread of infection in the future.  
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Finally, Higher the level of filtering more will be number of packets processed for 
infection and hence more will be delay. 
 
4.5 The Analysis of Optimization problems 
In this section we consider (time dependent) optimal control strategies associated with 
infection and treatment cost based on classical SIS model. To determine the 
appropriate number of nodes to filter, we need to develop a mathematical model of the 
potential costs involved in infection and treatment at a given time. We will develop 
cost functions that systems administrators can use to help determine an appropriate 
level of treatment. Goldman and Lightwood [55] introduced the cost optimization 
problem of minimizing the two cost of disease; a constant per period economic cost of 
disease and per period cost function of treatment. Our problem is to minimize the total 
cost of infection and treatment over the finite period time.  






+∫ ]     (4.8) 
 
where the control function, Q(t), represents the fraction of total infected nodes 











∂ )()()( , I(0) = I0  (4.9) 
 
where β, δ, and λ are know positive constants and I0 is the known initial infected node. 
 
4.5.1 Necessary Conditions for Optimization 
Our objective functional balances the effect of minimizing the cases of implementing 
the filtering treatments and minimizing the total cost of infection. The necessary 
conditions that an optimal control variable must satisfy come from Pontryagin’s 
Maximum Principle [56, 57]. In order to derive the necessary conditions we introduce 
the adjoint variable ϕ and the Hamiltonian equation, H. This principle converts 
equation (4.8) and (4.9) into a problem of minimizing a Hamiltonian, H, for the 
optimization problem: 
 
])()([)( QQIINIQCICH I λδβϕ −−−−++=            (4.10) 
 












I             (4.11) 
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where the state problem has initial values I(0) = I0 and the adjoint problem has final 
values ϕ (T) = 0. 







            (4.12) 
 
We denote  as the marginal cost of treatment then say )(QC ′ QQC α=′ )(  where α is 
equal to the marginal value of an additional unit of the treatment. 
Suppose Q* is an optimal control for the above problem and I* is the corresponding 




ϕ*(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T             (4.13) 
 
Substituting equation (4.13) into equation (4.9) gives 
 
  I *& α
δλδβ
2)()( −−−−= IINI ϕ*, I*(0) = I   (4.14) 0                
  ϕ& * = ϕ* ICNI −+− )2( δββ ,  ϕ*(T) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T         (4.15) 
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The optimal control is determined by equations (4.13)-(4.15), that is, we must solve 
equations (4.14) and (4.15) for optimum trajectory and an adjoint variable.  
Next, we discuss the numerical solutions of the optimality system and the 
corresponding optimal control pairs, the parameter choices, and the interpretations. 
 
4.5.2 Numerical Results 
In this section, we study numerically an optimal treatment strategy for minimizing the 
total cost of infection since the full dynamic solution of the control problem is usually 
very difficult and an explicit function-formula does not exist except for very special 
cases [55, 56, 62]. The optimal treatment strategy is obtained by solving the optimality 
system, consisting of two differential equations from the state and adjoint equations 
presented in previous section. 
Figure 4.2 (a) shows that the average number of infected nodes is plotted as a 
function of time. The graph contains 1000 nodes and the infection, cure and treated 
rates are β = 1.0 and δ = 0.2, λ = 0.8 respectively. For the figure 4.2, we assume that 
the cost weight factor, CI, associated with the number of infected nodes I(t) is less or 
equal to marginal cost of treatment, α, which is associated with a control Q(t). In figure 
4.2, the set of the cost weight factors, CI = 200 and α = 500, is chosen to illustrate the 
optimal treatment strategy. 
Note that with treatment the number of infected nodes eventually reaches almost 
50% of the total population, and the infection growth slows down after that.  
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Figure 4.2: Optimal control strategy constructed us
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4.6 Simulation Experiments 
In this section we describe our experimental design and compare the numerical 
solution of the optimal control problem with the results of our simulation. We also 
present measurements of Internet worm infections in two different strategies (with 
treatment and without treatment) with random rates at which an infectious node 
attempts to infect its neighboring nodes and random rates at which it cures itself or is 
treated with a filtering treatment. In addition to measurements of worm infection, we 
attempt to answer the following question: 
 
1. What is the optimal level of treatment which should be chosen to minimize the 
total cost of infection? 
2. When to start filtering to minimize unnecessary treatment cost? 
3. Is there a relationship between treatment cost and infection rate? 
 
These experiments provide insight into the characteristics of infection propagation on 
computer networks and they also serve as the basis for future research work on 
quarantine of virulent Internet worms.  
 
4.6.1 Network Model 
Our experiments have been conducted using a simulation environment that is capable 
of simulating thousands of computing nodes with random network topology and a viral 
epidemic model. The network topology that is used in this simulation is constructed by 
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Transit Stub model that produces hierarchical graphs in a different way by consisting 
of interconnected transit and stub domains [17].  
We assume that the population consists of N nodes whose connections to one 
another form a fixed random graph. A node n is said to have a degree k(n) if it is 
connected to k other nodes. In case of random graphs the degree distribution is Poisson 
with a certain mean degree K = 〈k(n)〉. In our simulations with random graph based 
networks, we typically built networks with average degree K = 5 and 1000 nodes. Our 
simulation is an event-driven simulation which is the most accurate method to simulate 
the propagation of a worm.  
Simulation proceeds in steps of one time unit. During each step, every infectious 
node I attempts to infect each of its neighbors j with infection rate β. In addition, every 
infectious node I is subject to a curing attempt with cure rate δ. If the curing of I occurs 
before the infection attempt, then I does not send out infections to j. In this experiment 
the infection process was simulated by varying the connectivity of topology, the 
number of nodes, and the rate of infection β , cure δ and treated λ.. 
 
4.6.2 System Model 
We consider a network with 1000 routers and a limited buffer is assigned to each router 
for storing packets which need to be sent and received. A few assumptions and 
simplifications were made to ensure feasibility of our experiment. First, a single 
initially infected node is randomly selected to release worm in each trial and we 
performed 100 simulation runs using the same parameters.  
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Figure 4.3: Three cases of network delay: (a) No infection occurs (b) Infection without 
treatment (if node j is infected) (c) Infection with treatment (if node j is infected) 
 
Second, for measuring the network delay we randomly choose some pairs of a source 
and destination. Each source creates several good (no infection) packets and stores 
them into its buffer per time unit. We use an all-pair shortest path routing technique to 
send good packets from source to destination.  
Figure 4.3 provides more details about the network delay. Assume that each link 
has a delay of 1 time unit. A processing delay of 1 is assigned to a host when it is 
infected, since the system performance is reduced by the infection. We also assign an 
additional delay of 1 for the packet filtering on a treated node. In case (b) a node k 
which is the next hop from node j, receives a packet G1 at time 4 while in case (c) it 
takes 5 time unit for the same node to receive a packet G1 due to packet filtering 
system in which only good packets are forwarded to next hop and bad (infectious) 
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packets are dropped. Finally, to simulate the model, time is divided into a number of 
discrete steps, and on each step the population of individuals in each state is altered 
according to the different rules such as different rate of infection and recovery, which 
means that nodes move between the S (Susceptible) and I (Infectious) states at a certain 
rate. In addition, relevant data is recorded per unit time and simulation stops when 
some desired state is reached, such as the completion of simulation time. 
 
4.6.3 Simulation Results 
In this section, we present a set of simulation results that demonstrate the accuracy of 
our analytical models in describing optimal treatment strategy on random transit-stub 
networks with infection and treatment costs. Figure 4.4 shows the total number of 
infectious nodes averaged across the 100 runs of the two different types of simulation 
models (with treatment and without treatment). Note that without treatment the average 
number of infectious nodes increased exponentially and eventually reaches almost 80% 
of the total population, and the infection growth decayed after that. But in the other 
case (with treatment) the average number of infectious nodes reached almost 60% of 
the total population and the spread of infection was decreased. For the number of 
infected nodes obtaining treatment, Q(t), we choose 40 % of total infected nodes at 
each time. It notes that a certain level of treatment for infection can effectively reduce 
the spread of worm infection. 
Figure 4.5 shows that for the optimal treatment strategy the control variable Q*(t) 




















Figure 4.4: Comparison of the average number of infectious nodes as a function of time 
in two different epidemic strategies. For the cases above we used 1000 nodes, an 
average infection rate β of 1.0, a cure rate δ of 0.2, and a treatment rate λ of 0.8 
 
figure 4.2. These two curves show that simulation results are consistent with our 
numerical results of the optimization problem as described in section 4.5.2. It has been 
determined that higher the level of a filtering treatment, which means increasing the 
treatment rate, less will number of infectious nodes spread for infection.  
However, since a filtering treatment presumably bears a significant cost, an optimal 
choice of the treatment rate, λ, for a given infection rate is an important issue. From 
figure 4.5 we conclude that for a given infection and cure rates if one follows the 
optimal control Q*(t) trajectory then the spread of infection can be significantly 
reduced or even eliminated at a small additional cost. This implies that the optimal 
treatment strategy derives its value from reducing the current infection rate and from 

























Figure 4.5: Optimal control Q*(t) and I*(t) are plotted as a function of time for N = 
1000, β = 1.0, δ = 0.2, λ = 0.8  
 
                       
 Q(t) = 0% Q(t) = 10% Q(t) = 20% Q(t) = 30% ... Q(t) = 90% Q(t) =100% 
t I(t) C(t) I(t) C(t) I(t) C(t) I(t) C(t)     I(t) C(t) I(t) C(t) 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1 1 2 
1 6 6 4 4 4 5 5 6     5 9 5 10 
2 9 9 6 6 7 8 8 10     7 10 7 14 
3 10 10 9 9 10 12 8 10     8 13 9 18 
4 18 18 12 13 17 20 9 11     9 14 8 16 
5 46 46 28 30 44 52 9 11     11 16 10 20 
6 108 108 78 85 103 123 19 24     13 26 15 30 
7 226 226 181 199 210 252 48 62     33 65 34 68 
8 394 394 344 378 368 441 139 180     67 112 62 134 
9 596 596 573 630 524 628 279 362     78 140 100 200 
10 752 752 737 810 666 799 454 590     122 219 111 222 
…                             
96 898 898 717 788 567 680 417 542     512 1003 556 1112 
97 898 898 721 792 572 686 419 544     487 895 623 1123 
98 896 896 721 792 551 661 415 539     468 925 687 1374 
99 896 896 736 809 542 650 423 549     645 1192 765 1530 
100 897 897 736 809 516 619 425 552     687 1212 825 1650 
        
Table 4.2 Determination of optimal control Q*(t) and I*(t) 
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Table 4.2 shows how to obtain optimal control Q*(t) and I*(t) from our simulation 
results. First, we perform 100 simulation runs using the same parameters and select a 
minimum value of total infection cost, C(t), at each time t. From table 4.2 one curve 
line indicates the optimal trajectory for total infection cost. In next step we can 
determine the control variable Q(t) and state variable I(t) according to the total 
infection cost C(t) at each time. For example, from table 4.2 we select a value of 4 for a 
minimum infection cost C(t) at t = 1, then we can find that the number of infected 
nodes, I (t = 1), is 4 and the number of infected nodes getting treatment, Q (t = 1), is 
10 % of I (t = 1). 
The average delay of good packets over infection rates for two different types of 
simulation models is shown in figure 4.6. For this experiment, we make a simulation 
across 100 runs as described in figure 4.4. All parameters assigned in this experiment 
are the same as those given in figure 4.5. In addition to these two types of strategies, 
we also analyzed the average delay of the good packets generated on only a set of 
source nodes. As seen from the figure 4.6, without treatment the average delay 
increases exponentially as the epidemic becomes saturated while with treatment the 
average delay is not drastically increased with the same increase of infection rates. It 
implies that a filtering treatment of worm infection is very effective for reducing the 
spread of infection and minimizing the total infection costs as referred to network delay. 
It is further observed that the treatment of worm propagation in its early stage is not an 
optimal time to minimize the total cost of infection since there is little difference in the 
average delay between the two cases (with treatment and without treatment) until the 






















without treatment with treatment
 
Figure 4.6: Comparison of the average delay as infection rates in two different 
epidemic strategies  
 
For example, figure 4.6 shows that the filtering treatment of worm infection could be 
started as late as when the infection rate is 0.4 without having more than a marginal 
effect on the total cost of infection.  
There is a security issue for the security administrator to find an appropriate time to 
start filtering since there are unnecessary treatment costs incurred by filtering too early and 
also delaying a filtering treatment. In particular, many security administrators feel that 
it is imperative to start a filtering treatment immediately. This, however, is just 
representing those sites that have very high risk of penetration and have ample 
resources to do an entire treatment. Our intent in this study is to provide guidelines to 
those who do not have sufficient resources to immediately detect and filter everything, 
and must choose where to allocate scarce security resources. We have used the 
empirical data to arrive at concrete recommendations for delaying a filtering treatment 
until there is assurance that the treatment is not likely to cause unnecessary costs. 
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4.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have presented the optimal control problem of minimizing the total 
cost of infection which can be interpreted as the network delay incurred by both 
infection and treatment. This chapter focuses on the application of optimal control 
theory to minimizing the value of two costs. We have derived the necessary conditions 
for our optimal control problem which is solved numerically.  
We also validated the numerical solution with our simulation results. It has been 
determined that by applying this optimal control strategy, one can very effectively 
reduce the spread of infection and minimize the total cost of infection for the case of 
random graphs. However, we could wait for a certain ratio of the total number of nodes 
to be infected before starting treatment, and this would prevent an unnecessary network 
delay which would happen if treatment were started earlier.  
This chapter considered only the question of how many nodes to filter and when to 
obtain filtering services to minimize the infection cost and reduce the spread of worm 
infection. We are also working on the development of effective quarantine techniques 












Conclusion and Future work 
 
In this chapter, dissertation contributions as well as future work will be summarized. 
First, a brief introduction about the problem we are trying to solve is presented. Then, 
an organization of dissertation contribution is discussed followed by the appropriate 
category including a brief summary of each chapter. At the end, future work directions 
are presented and discussed.  
 
5.1 Problems 
Many early Internet protocols were designed without a fundamentally secure 
infrastructure and hence vulnerable to Internet attacks such as denial of service (DoS) 
attacks and worms. DoS attacks attempt to consume the resources of a remote host or 
network, thereby denying or degrading service to legitimate users. In fact, many attacks 
can be launched readily from anywhere in the world masquerading the location of the 
 
110
attacker. Network forensics is an emerging area wherein the source or the cause of the 
attacker is determined using IDS tools. The problem of finding the source(s) of attack(s) 
is called trace back problem. Lately, Internet worms have become a major problem for 
the security of computer networks, causing considerable amount of resources and time 
to be spent recovering from the disruption of systems. In addition to breaking down 
victims, these worms create a large amount of unnecessary network data traffic that 
results in network congestion, thereby affecting the entire network. However, the task 
of detection and prevention of worms has become more difficult on our existing 
computing infrastructure. 
 
5.2 Organization of Proposals 
In this dissertation, we have analyzed some security issues in Internet attack through an 
investigation of Internet worm propagation models and an identification of intrusion 
source. Also we attempt to solve an optimal control problem of minimizing the total 
cost of infection in terms of network delay. This analysis of security issues took two 
categories. First, to develop appropriate tools for thwarting quick spread of worms, we 
are trying to understand the behavior of the worm propagation with the aid of 
epidemiological models and to provide mathematical models of control factors that 
influence Internet worm propagation called Infection Pattern. The second category is 
motivated by the fact that we have to react to Intrusions, be a worm based intrusion or 
others. Reacting to intrusions has two kinds of actions; one is intrusion source 
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identification, the other is network defense with an optimal level of treatment. Chapter 
2 and 4 describe about the latter category while chapter 3 is for the former category.   
 
5.3 Infection Patterns 
In chapter 3, we presented the classical SIS model and a modification of SIR model of 
Kermack-Mckendrick to understand the behavior of the worm propagation with the aid 
of epidemiological models. The analytical models that we provide are useful in 
determining the rate of spread and time required to infect a majority of the nodes in the 
network. We also present measurements of worm infections in two different network 
topologies and in one of the topologies we use the round-trip time collected by using 
the NLANR Active Measurement Program (AMP).  Whereas in the SIR model once a 
node is cured after infection it becomes permanently immune, our modification allows 
this immunity to be temporary, since the cured nodes may again become susceptible or 
infected, maybe with a different strain of the same worm.  Our simulation results on 
large Internet like topologies show that in a fairly small amount of time, 80% of the 
network nodes is infected.  For example, on the Abilene Internet2 topology using real 
link delays we have shown that the worm can spread and infect 80% of the nodes in 
about 30ms. The simulation study also shows that time to infect large portions of the 
network vary significantly depending on where the infection begins.  This information 
could be usefully employed to choose hosts for quarantine to delay worm propagation 




5.4 Reacting to Intrusions 
In chapter 2, we have introduced several trace back techniques and defined a trace back 
problem more formally. Our goal in this work is to determine the sources of intrusions 
or at least the routers closest to the intruders using a minimal amount of network 
resources. We have developed a novel algorithm to decompose a network into 
connected components and using high traffic routers on the connected components, we 
construct a terminal network. A centroid decomposition technique is applied on the 
terminal network. Based on the position of the victim in the network, our scheme 
selects only a small fraction of routers to monitor the traffic to identify packets that 
bear the signatures of the attack packets. From the information provided by these 
chosen routers, the network is pruned and another set of routers is chosen to identify 
the source of attack, until the source router is detected. The trace back can be 
completed in O(logn) steps, where n is the number of terminal nodes (routers) in the 
terminal network. Contribution of our work is to identify the set of routers that are 
requested to log, mark, or authenticate depending upon the type of attack.  The number 
of routers identified for this task will be kept at a minimum yet sufficient to reduce the 
burden on the routers. 
In chapter 4, we have presented an optimization model that takes into account the 
infection and treatment costs. We have two variables that we need to work with: delay 
caused by filtering of worms at routers, and the delay due to worms’ excessive amount 
of network traffic. On one hand filtering causes delays at routers and on the other 
worm’s packets overload the buffer at routers and this in turn causes additional delays 
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for genuine packets. Furthermore, we defined the objective of minimizing the total cost 
of infection and derived the necessary conditions for our cost optimization problem 
which is solved numerically. Using this model we can determine the level of treatment 
to be applied for a given rate of infection spread.  We have devised a technique again 
borrowing from epidemic models to determine the optimal start point for filtering and 
optimal number of nodes in the network that should perform the filtering. The 
simulation study shows the optimal level of treatment which should be chosen to 
minimize the total cost of infection and to reduce the current infection rate, providing 
both a mathematical model of the control factors affecting how many nodes needed to 
filter, and collecting empirical data to compare the numerical solution of our analytical 
model with the results of our simulation. Finally, we noted that our simulation results 
can explain when to start the filtering treatment to reduce an unnecessary network 
delay incurred by filtering too early and also delaying a filtering. 
 
5.5 Future Work 
For future work in this area, we intend to develop an effective quarantine method using 
the knowledge of worm propagation and of cost optimization problem for worm 
infection. Due to the fast spreading nature and great damage of Internet worms, it is 
necessary to implement automatic mitigation such as dynamic quarantine. This 
information could be usefully employed to choose hosts for quarantine to reduce the 
prospects of the spread of infection in the future. In addition to development of 
quarantine techniques, we attempt to answer several questions:  
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• What is effective size of quarantine?  
• How can we detect and monitor an unknown (zero-day) worm?  
• How can we defend against the spread of unknown worms effectively?  
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SIS Epidemic Model 
The SIS model (where removals are ignored) is described by:  
JkSJ
dt
dS λ+−=  and  JkSJdt
dJ λ−=  
The initial conditions are: S(0) = S0 and J(0) = J0  
To get (easily) an analytic solution, we observe that: S + J = N. Thus, S = N – J. 
Substituting to the second differential equation we obtain:  
JJJNk
dt
dJ λ−−= )(  which simplifies into 2)( kJJkNdt
dJ
−−= λ  
The differential equation could be solved using Maple as:  
Note: Since I is used (reserved word in Maple) to denote: I = sqrt(-1); we use the 
variable J to denote the number of infected in the fixed population. 
> restart; 
> dsolve({diff(J(t),t)= k*(N-J(t))*J(t)-lambda*J(t), J(0) = J0}, J(t)); 
J t( ) = 
J0 k N - λ( )
k J0 + e
- k N - λ( ) t( ) k N - e
- k N - λ( ) t( ) λ - e




J t( ) = 
J0 k N - λ( )
k J0 + e
- k N - λ( ) t( ) k N - e
- k N - λ( ) t( ) λ - e





J t( ) = 
J0 k N - λ( )
k N - λ - k J0( ) e




Warning, the name changecoords has been redefined 
> N:= 100: S0:= 99: J0:=1: k:=0.8: lambda:=0.2: 
> J:= unapply(J0*(k*N-lambda)/((k*N-lambda-J0*k)*exp(-(k*N-lambda)*t)+J0*k), t); 
J := t → 79.8
79.0 e -79.8 t( ) + 0.8
 
 
> plot([t,J(t), t = 0..10],t= 0..10, tickmarks=[5,5], labels=[`t`,`J(t)`]); 

























SIRS Epidemic Model 





Warning, the name changecoords has been redefined 
 
Define SIR equations, parameters and initial conditions 
beta = rate from  S -> I 
lamda = rate from I -> R 
mu = rate from R -> S   (b=0 gives the SIR model) 
> beta:= 0.07: lamda:= 0.02: mu:= 0.007: 
eqns := diff(S(t),t)=-beta*S(t)*J(t)+mu*R(t), 
            diff(J(t),t)= beta*S(t)*J(t)-lamda*J(t), 
            diff(R(t),t) = lamda*J(t)-mu*R(t); 




 S t( ) = -0.07 S t( ) J t( ) + 0.007 R t( ), d
 dt
 J t( ) = 0.07 S t( ) J t( ) - 0.02 J t( ), d
 dt




inits := S 0( ) = 9.9, J 0( ) = 0.1, R 0( ) = 0.
 
Generate a numerical solution 
> soln := dsolve({eqns,inits},{S(t),J(t),R(t)}, type=numeric, output=listprocedure): 
 
Generate string for title 
> rr := convert(beta,string):  aa := convert(lamda,string): 
   bb := convert(mu,string): 
   code := cat(`SIRS Model with rates beta = `,rr,`, lamda = `,aa,`, mu = `,bb); 
code := SIRS Model with rates beta = .7e-1, lamda = .2e-1, mu = .7e-2
 
 
Define functions for the susceptibles - S(t), the infecteds - J(t) and the removed - R(t) 
> s := subs(soln,S(t)): j:=subs(soln,J(t)): r := subs(soln,R(t)); 











Optimal Control Problem 
Suppose Q* is an optimal control for the optimization problem and I* is the 
corresponding trajectory. The optimal control is determined by two equations below, 
that is, we must solve these equations for optimum trajectory and an adjoint variable. 
  I& * α
δλδβ
2)()( −−−−= IINI ϕ*, I*(0) = I0                         
  ϕ& * = ϕ* ICNI −+− )2( δββ ,  ϕ*(T) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T     
 
Next, we solve the numerical solutions of the optimality system and the corresponding 




Warning, the name changecoords has been redefined 





 J t( ) = J t( ) 99.8 - 1.0 J t( )( ) - 0.0003600000000 ψ t( ), d
 dt





> inits:=J(0)=1, psi(0)=1200; 
inits := J 0( ) = 1, ψ 0( ) = 1200
 
> soln := dsolve({CM_Model,inits},{J(t),psi(t)},type=numeric, output=listprocedure): 


































18 _a  - 40 _a 3 + 25 _a 4 + 16 _a 2  + 25 _C1


























18  _a  - 40  _a 3 + 25  _a 4 + 16  _a 2  + 25  _C1





























 J t( ) + 200
9
 J t( ) - 250
9
 J t( )2
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
 
> odeplot(soln,[J(t),psi(t)],0..100); 
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